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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE NATURE OF THE UNION 
Bradford R. Clark∗ 
Leading theories of the Eleventh Amendment start from the premise that its text makes 
no sense.  These theories regard the Amendment as either underinclusive, overinclusive, 
or an incoherent compromise because it prohibits federal courts from hearing “any suit” 
against a state by out-of-state citizens, but does not prohibit suits against a state by its 
own citizens.  Two of these theories would either expand or contract the immunity 
conferred by the text of the Amendment in order to avoid this absurd or anomalous 
result.  This Article suggests that the Eleventh Amendment made sense as written when 
understood in its full historical context.  In particular, the Articles of Confederation 
empowered Congress to require states to supply men, money, and supplies, but gave 
Congress no power to enforce its own commands.  Prominent Founders initially argued 
that the only way to fix the Articles was to give Congress coercive power over states.  
But the Convention and the ratifiers ultimately rejected this idea because they feared 
that the introduction of such power would lead to a civil war.   
To avoid this danger, the Founders designed the Constitution to give Congress legislative 
power over individuals rather than states.  This novel approach eliminated the need for 
coercive power over states, and provided Federalists with a key argument for adopting 
the Constitution rather than amending the Articles.  Antifederalists threatened to 
undermine this case for the Constitution by arguing that the state-citizen diversity 
provisions of Article III — authorizing suits “between” states and out-of-state citizens 
— could be construed to permit suits against states (and thus imply federal power to 
enforce any resulting judgments against states).  Although Federalists denied this 
construction, the Supreme Court proceeded to read Article III to permit out-of-state 
citizens to sue states.  Federalists and Antifederalists quickly joined forces to restore 
their preferred construction of Article III.  In adopting the Eleventh Amendment, they 
saw no anomaly in prohibiting “any suit” against a state by out-of-state citizens because 
they did not understand the Constitution to authorize any suits against states by in-state 
citizens.  Federal question jurisdiction did not expressly authorize such suits, and the 
Founders likely would not have perceived any real need for such jurisdiction given their 
understanding that the Constitution conferred neither legislative nor coercive power over 
states.  Because the Eleventh Amendment, as written, made sense in light of the nature 
of the Union, the absurdity doctrine cannot justify departing from the terms of the 
Amendment. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ William Cranch Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law 
School.  For insightful comments, I thank A.J. Bellia, Curtis Bradley, Evan Caminker, Andy 
Coan, Dick Fallon, Philip Hamburger, Joan Larsen, John Manning, Maeva Marcus, Jon Molot, 
Henry Monaghan, Jim Pfander, Jeff Powell, Gil Seinfeld, Jon Siegel, Jeff Sutton, Ed Swaine, 
Amanda Tyler, Carlos Vázquez, and workshop participants at the George Washington, Michigan, 
Northwestern, and Notre Dame Law Schools.  I also thank Jonathan Bond, John Kammerer, Ja-
son Karasik, Max Kosman, Brittany Lewis-Roberts, Ryan Watson, Brian Wesoloski, and William 
Zapf for excellent research assistance. 
2010] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1819 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
eading theories of the Eleventh Amendment place surprisingly lit-
tle emphasis on the words of the Amendment.  In fact, according 
to one prominent observer, “the [E]leventh [A]mendment is universally 
taken not to mean what it says.”2  The reason is that most courts and 
commentators regard the Amendment as either grossly under- or over-
inclusive.  In their view, the best way to understand and apply the 
Amendment is to look past its terms to its underlying purpose (as they 
define it).  Modern theorists feel justified in expanding or contracting 
the immunity conferred by the text because they believe that following 
the Amendment as written would produce the anomalous — or even 
absurd — result of barring out-of-state citizens from suing states in 
federal court while leaving in-state citizens free to do so.  As a result, 
leading theories of the Amendment tend to focus on why the Amend-
ment cannot mean what it says. 
This Article offers a novel account of why the Eleventh Amend-
ment made sense at the time it was adopted and simultaneously pro-
vides insight into the Founders’ understanding of the nature of the 
Union.  The Articles of Confederation authorized Congress to exercise 
legislative power over states rather than individuals, but provided no 
means of enforcement.  The Founders concluded that the Articles 
could be made effective only by authorizing Congress to employ coer-
cive military force against states who refused to comply with its affir-
mative commands.  The Founders rejected proposals to introduce 
coercive force, however, because they feared that the use of such pow-
er would lead to a civil war.  They abandoned the Articles in favor of 
a Constitution specifically designed to authorize Congress to exercise 
legislative power solely over individuals rather than states.  This ap-
proach obviated the need for the introduction of coercive power over 
states.  To be sure, the Constitution imposed important negative pro-
hibitions on states, but these provisions could be enforced in suits be-
tween individuals or as federal defenses to enforcement actions 
brought by states.  Thus, enforcing these prohibitions did not necessi-
tate either suits by individuals against states or the use of coercive 
power against states. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  
 2 Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part 
One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 516 (1977). 
L
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This background helps to make sense of the Eleventh Amendment.  
The Amendment was adopted to overturn a construction of Article III 
that permitted out-of-state citizens to sue states in federal court, result-
ing in judgments that implied federal coercive power of the very kind 
the Constitution was designed to avoid.  During ratification, Antifed-
eralists had warned that the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article 
III could be construed to permit such suits.  The Amendment did not 
attempt to bar in-state citizens from suing their own states because no 
one had suggested that Article III would permit such suits.  Moreover, 
if the Founders were correct in assuming that the Constitution neither 
imposed nor permitted Congress to impose affirmative obligations on 
states, then there would never be any suits against states to enforce 
such obligations.  On this understanding, the Amendment’s ban on all 
suits by out-of-state citizens was a complete solution to the problem of 
suits by individuals against states, and thus created no anomaly. 
Current theories of the Eleventh Amendment — the immunity 
theory, the diversity theory, and the compromise theory — all presup-
pose that the Amendment was poorly drafted and would produce 
anomalous or absurd results if applied as written.  The traditional 
“immunity” theory, currently embraced by a majority of the Supreme 
Court (but few academics), argues that states enjoy broad constitution-
al sovereign immunity beyond the terms of the Amendment.  Propo-
nents of broad immunity regard the Amendment’s text as unaccept-
ably underinclusive because it bars suits only by out-of-state citizens.  
In Hans v. Louisiana,3 the Court famously characterized a citizen’s 
suggestion that “[t]he letter” of the Amendment left him free to sue his 
own state as “an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a 
construction never imagined or dreamed of.”4  In the Court’s view, the 
purpose of the Amendment was to bar all suits by individuals against 
states.  According to the Court, the supposition that the states would 
have adopted an amendment permitting their own citizens to sue them 
in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States “is 
almost an absurdity on its face.”5 
By contrast, the more recent “diversity” theory, endorsed by a mi-
nority of the Court (but many academics), regards the text of the Elev-
enth Amendment as unacceptably overinclusive.6  Diversity theorists 
insist that the Amendment’s prohibition against “any suit” cannot be 
applied literally because it would lead to the anomalous conclusion 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 4 Id. at 15. 
 5 Id.  
 6 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against 
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983). 
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that in-state citizens can invoke federal question jurisdiction to sue a 
state but out-of-state citizens cannot.  The purpose of the Amendment, 
they say, was merely to prohibit those suits in which jurisdiction rests 
solely on the state-citizen diversity clauses of Article III, not to curtail 
jurisdiction over suits against states supported by any of Article III’s 
other heads of jurisdiction. 
Ironically, both groups criticize each other for ignoring aspects of 
the constitutional text.  For example, proponents of broad immunity 
argue that the diversity theory contradicts the Amendment’s express 
prohibition against extending the judicial power to “any suit” by an 
out-of-state citizen against a state because the theory would allow just 
such suits under federal question jurisdiction.  Conversely, diversity 
theorists charge that broad immunity disregards the Eleventh 
Amendment’s precise terms, which preclude jurisdiction over suits by 
out-of-state citizens but say nothing to bar suits brought by citizens 
against their own states. 
The “compromise” theory of the Eleventh Amendment attempts to 
avoid these criticisms by accepting the Amendment as written.  This 
theory suggests that the Amendment reflects an unrecorded, and less 
than fully coherent, compromise.7  On this view, courts should simply 
follow the text and ignore any resulting anomalies.8  According to the 
proponents of this theory, it is simply not possible to discover the orig-
inal meaning of the Amendment or to identify its precise purpose.9 
Understood in light of the shift from the Articles of Confederation 
to the Constitution, however, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment 
were neither underinclusive, overinclusive, nor an incoherent compro-
mise.  Rather, they were a carefully crafted response to widespread 
demands following Chisholm v. Georgia10 for an amendment that 
would remove or explain any provision of the Constitution that could 
be construed to permit individuals to sue states in federal court.  The 
only provisions that anyone had ever suggested might authorize such 
suits were the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III.  Al-
though the utility of original meaning as a guide to interpretation re-
mains contested, this Article starts from the assumption that the origi-
nal meaning is relevant both because the Supreme Court and leading 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 113 (1989) (“The amendment was a product of Federalist political prudence 
and congressional compromise.”). 
 8 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Commentary, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989). 
 9 See John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional 
Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1722 (2004); cf. Andrew B. Coan, Essay, Text as Truce: A Peace Propos-
al for the Supreme Court’s Costly War over the Eleventh Amendment, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511 
(2006). 
 10 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
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scholars have examined the Amendment in these terms, and because 
the original meaning confirms the most natural reading of the text.  
The keys to deciphering the Amendment are the Founders’ under-
standings that the new Constitution (1) did not authorize Congress to 
exercise legislative power over states (as opposed to individuals), (2) 
did not guarantee individuals affirmative relief against states, and (3) 
did not grant the federal government coercive power to enforce federal 
commands directly against states.   
Given these assumptions (and the tradition of sovereign immunity), 
the Founders appear to have assumed that only an express constitu-
tional authorization could empower federal courts to hear suits against 
states.  The Founders publicly debated whether the state-citizen diver-
sity provisions of Article III constituted such authorization.  Antifed-
eralists charged that the power to hear suits between a state and out-
of-state citizens included the power to hear suits against states.  Lead-
ing Federalists responded that these provisions should be construed to 
permit jurisdiction only over suits by states against individuals.  No 
similar debate took place over whether federal question jurisdiction 
permitted suits against states, perhaps because this provision did not 
mention states and because the Founders may not have regarded suits 
against states as necessary to enforce federal law.  This background 
helps to explain why the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment saw 
their task as simply to close a loophole created by the state-citizen di-
versity provisions of Article III.  Given their assumptions about the 
nature of the Union, the Founders would not have understood the 
Constitution to authorize federal question suits against states.  Thus, 
they would not have understood the Eleventh Amendment to create 
the anomaly between in-state and out-of-state citizens that modern 
theorists perceive. 
The Articles of Confederation authorized Congress to command 
states to provide money, troops, and supplies to the central govern-
ment, but provided no means of enforcement.  The Founders con-
cluded that the only way to make the Articles effective was to empow-
er Congress to use military force to coerce state compliance with its 
commands.  The Founders rejected reliance on coercive force, howev-
er, because they believed it would lead to a civil war.11  The Constitu-
tional Convention consciously drafted the Constitution to avoid the 
need for coercive power by granting Congress legislative power over 
individuals rather than states and by giving individuals only negative 
rights against states.  During the ratification debates, one of the Fed-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 
1683, 1780 (1997) (“The Founders rejected the prevalent system because they believed that duties 
could be enforced against political bodies only through military force.”). 
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eralists’ most powerful arguments against the Articles and in favor of 
the Constitution was that only the Constitution avoided the need to in-
troduce coercive power against states.  The argument was so powerful 
that Antifederalists largely abandoned the Articles as beyond repair 
and focused on ways to improve the Constitution (by, for example, 
proposing a Bill of Rights). 
During ratification, however, Antifederalists threatened to under-
mine the Federalists’ structural case for the Constitution by pointing 
out that Article III could be construed as an express authorization for 
federal courts to hear suits against states by citizens of another state or 
a foreign state.  Such suits, they pointed out, would create the very en-
forcement problems that Federalists insisted the Constitution was de-
signed to avoid.  Leading Federalists responded by denying that Ar-
ticle III would be construed to permit suits against states by 
individuals.  Rather, they argued that it should be construed to confer 
jurisdiction only over cases in which a state was a plaintiff.  A broader 
construction, they argued, would serve no purpose, because any recov-
ery against a state for its debts could not be enforced “without waging 
war against the contracting State.”12  They maintained that to ascribe, 
by implication, “a power which would involve such a consequence, 
would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.”13 
Notwithstanding such Federalist assurances, the Supreme Court in 
Chisholm construed Article III to encompass a suit against a state by a 
citizen of another state.  Federalists and Antifederalists immediately 
united to amend the Constitution to preclude Article III from being 
construed in this fashion.  There was widespread sentiment that the 
Constitution should neither permit individuals to sue states nor em-
power the federal government to coerce state compliance with any re-
sulting judgments.  The Founders adopted the Eleventh Amendment 
to “explain” Article III and restore their preferred construction of the 
judicial power.  Framing the Amendment as an explanatory amend-
ment had several distinct advantages.  It restored the construction of 
Article III that Federalists had promised during the ratification de-
bates; it rebuked the Supreme Court for its contrary construction; and 
it applied retroactively to deny jurisdiction over all pending suits 
against states. 
Viewed from the Founders’ perspective, the Eleventh Amendment 
would have provided a fully coherent, even elegant, solution to the 
problem posed by Chisholm’s interpretation of Article III.  The 
Amendment cuts across all jurisdictional categories in Article III by 
denying federal courts judicial power to hear “any suit” against a state 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 13 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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brought by a prohibited plaintiff.  Modern commentators find this 
anomalous because the text — read literally — would prohibit out-of-
state citizens from bringing federal question suits against states, but 
leave in-state citizens free to do so.  This anomaly disappears, howev-
er, if one assumes (as the Founders did) that the original Constitution 
does not give individuals affirmative rights against states and does not 
repeat the “great and radical vice” of authorizing “legislation for states 
or governments, in their corporate or collective capacities.”14  Accor-
dingly, not even the most alarmist Antifederalists suggested during rat-
ification that in-state citizens could sue states using federal question 
jurisdiction.  Rather, the Founders assumed that individuals could 
never bring any federal question suits against states.  This forgotten 
context regarding the nature of the Union explains why no one at the 
time saw any anomaly in the Eleventh Amendment’s text. 
By the same token, the Eleventh Amendment itself provides impor-
tant evidence regarding the Founders’ understanding of the nature of 
the Union under the Constitution.  During the ratification debates, no 
one suggested that federal question jurisdiction could be construed to 
authorize individuals to sue states because the Founders assumed that 
the Constitution neither imposed — nor empowered Congress to im-
pose — obligations on states that would require coercive enforcement.  
Indeed, an error by one Federalist writer forced him to acknowledge 
publicly that “[t]here is no expression in the proposed plan to warrant” 
the conclusion “that the original jurisdiction of the federal court ex-
tends to cases between a state and its own citizens.”15  Given this as-
sumption, the debate between Federalists and Antifederalists  
over state suability focused exclusively on whether out-of-state  
citizens could sue states using the state-citizen diversity provisions of 
Article III.  The terms of the Eleventh Amendment reflect this under-
standing of the Constitution.  By barring out-of-state citizens from 
bringing “any suit” against a state in federal court, the Founders un-
derstood the Amendment to restore parity — not introduce disparity 
— between these groups.  In this sense, the terms of the Amendment 
reflect the Founders’ original conception of the Union created by the 
Constitution. 
Part I examines three current theories of the Eleventh Amendment 
— the immunity theory, the diversity theory, and the compromise 
theory — and explains that all three start from the questionable prem-
ise that the Amendment created an anomalous or absurd distinction 
between in-state and out-of-state citizens.  Part II examines the draft-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 108. 
 15 Aristides, Letter to the People of Maryland, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, April 1, 1788,  
at 1. 
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ing and ratification of the Constitution, and the fundamental decision 
to abandon legislative power over states under the Articles of Confede-
ration in favor of exclusive reliance on legislative power over individ-
uals.  This shift allowed the Constitution to enforce federal commands 
without introducing coercive force against states.  Part III describes 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia and subsequent 
efforts to adopt a constitutional amendment to remove or explain any 
clause in the Constitution that could be construed to permit individu-
als to sue states.  Part IV argues that the Eleventh Amendment was 
designed to overturn Chisholm and to restore the Founders’ preferred 
construction of Article III.  In historical context, the Amendment 
would not have been understood to create anomalous results because 
the Founders did not expect federal question jurisdiction to generate 
any suits by any citizens against any states.  Finally, Part V considers 
several potential implications of the historical understanding of the 
Eleventh Amendment.  Because the Amendment makes sense in his-
torical context, the absurdity doctrine provides no justification for ig-
noring its precise terms.  This context also helps to explain why the 
Court prohibits Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity 
under its Article I, Section 8 powers, but allows abrogation when Con-
gress invokes its power to enforce the Civil War Amendments.  The 
former powers were designed to avoid a civil war, whereas the latter 
powers were granted in response to the Civil War. 
II.  CURRENT THEORIES OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
The leading theories of the Eleventh Amendment go beyond the 
words of the Amendment without a fully convincing theoretical basis.  
On the one hand, for more than a century the Supreme Court has 
treated the Amendment as merely indicative of a broader underlying 
constitutional immunity.  This “immunity” theory maintains that the 
Amendment is not the exclusive, or even the primary, source of state 
sovereign immunity.  On the other hand, beginning in the 1980s, sev-
eral prominent academics and a minority of the Court embraced the 
“diversity” theory of the Eleventh Amendment.  This theory “contends 
that the amendment merely required a narrow construction of consti-
tutional language affirmatively authorizing federal court jurisdiction 
[between a state and citizens of another state or a foreign state] and 
that the amendment did nothing to prohibit federal court jurisdiction 
[in federal question cases].”16  Both theories have recently received in-
creased scrutiny from textualists who claim that neither is consistent 
with the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.  They hypothesize a third 
possibility — namely, that the text of the Amendment reflects an unre-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1034.   
1826 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1817 
corded and perhaps incoherent compromise.  Under this “compromise” 
theory, courts should follow the text of the Amendment without regard 
to any resulting anomalies.  Each of these theories rests on the premise 
that the text of the Eleventh Amendment creates an illogical distinc-
tion between in-state and out-of-state citizens.  The perceived anomaly 
disappears, however, when the Amendment is placed in the broader 
historical context of the shift from the Articles of Confederation to the 
Constitution. 
A.  The Immunity Theory 
The immunity theory — the Supreme Court’s dominant approach 
since 1890 — regards the text of the Eleventh Amendment as underin-
clusive, and therefore recognizes more state sovereign immunity than 
the text provides.  On this view, the Amendment is simply a partial 
confirmation of the states’ broader, preexisting immunity under the 
Constitution.  According to its adherents, this understanding is neces-
sary to avoid the absurd result that out-of-state citizens are barred 
from suing states in federal courts in all cases, but in-state citizens are 
free to bring such suits if otherwise permitted by Article III.  Thus, 
under this approach, the Supreme Court has come to understand “the 
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for 
the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms.”17 
Some background is useful to understand the emergence of the 
immunity theory.  In Chisholm v. Georgia,  the Supreme Court inter-
preted Article III (and the Judiciary Act of 1789) to permit a citizen of 
South Carolina to sue Georgia without its consent.  As Professor (now 
Judge) William Fletcher has noted, “[t]he reaction to Chisholm was 
immediate and hostile.”18  Constitutional amendments were introduced 
in both the House and Senate within two days of the decision,19 and 
numerous states, led by Massachusetts, urged Congress to adopt “such 
amendments in the Constitution of the United States as will remove 
any clause or article of the said Constitution which can be construed to 
imply or justify a decision that a State is compellable to answer in any 
suit by an individual or individuals in any Court of the United 
States.”20 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). 
 18 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1058. 
 19 See infra notes 439–442 and accompanying text. 
 20 Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, Sept. 27, 1793, reprinted in 5 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, 
at 440 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter 5 DHSC]; see infra notes 431–437 and accompany-
ing text. 
2010] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1827 
Congress responded by approving the Eleventh Amendment and 
sending it to the states for ratification in March 1794.21  By February 
1795, three-quarters of the states had approved the Amendment.22  In 
response, the Supreme Court dismissed all pending suits against states 
from its docket on the ground “that the amendment being constitu-
tionally adopted, there could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any 
case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens of anoth-
er state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state.”23  The Su-
preme Court had few occasions to apply the Eleventh Amendment 
prior to the Civil War, presumably because out-of-state and foreign cit-
izens recognized that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear their 
suits against states and because Congress had not yet granted lower 
federal courts general federal question jurisdiction.24   
More extensive consideration came after Congress extended general 
federal question jurisdiction to lower federal courts in 1875.  Just as 
the states’ efforts to avoid their debts following the Revolutionary War 
led individuals to sue states in the 1790s, similar state efforts following 
the Civil War led individuals to sue states at the end of the nineteenth 
century.  On this occasion, however, plaintiffs were armed with the 
Contracts Clause, which the Supreme Court had since interpreted to 
apply to public as well as private contracts.25  For example, following 
Reconstruction, Louisiana effectively repudiated its debts by amending 
its constitution and laws to impede repayment.26  These actions pro-
duced several important decisions. 
Until 1890, the Supreme Court’s decisions were consistent with the 
text of the Eleventh Amendment: federal courts could not entertain 
any suit — whether based on a federal question or diversity — 
brought against a state by a citizen of another state or of a foreign 
state.27  In Hans v. Louisiana,28 however, the Court looked beyond the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 66–
67 (1972). 
 22 Id. at 67. 
 23 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 382 (1798).  
 24 The Supreme Court did have appellate jurisdiction in federal question cases, but this led to 
only limited consideration of the Amendment.  See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
264 (1821) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent the Supreme Court from hear-
ing a federal question appeal in a criminal case brought by a state against its own citizen in state 
court). 
 25 See infra note 547 and accompanying text. 
 26 See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 63–66 (1987). 
 27 See Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 720 (1883) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred a federal question suit by out-of-state bondholders against state officers in 
their official capacity because it amounted to a suit against the state); see also New Hampshire v. 
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88–89 (1883) (dismissing a suit between states under the Eleventh 
Amendment because an individual was the real party in interest). 
 28 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
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terms of the Amendment and dismissed a citizen’s suit against his own 
state.  Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, sued Louisiana in federal court for 
repudiating its bonds in violation of the Contracts Clause.  Hans ar-
gued that he was “not embarrassed by the obstacle of the Eleventh 
Amendment, inasmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits against 
a State which are brought by the citizens of another State.”29  The 
Court acknowledged that “the amendment does so read,” but suggested 
that there was another “reason or ground for abating his suit.”30  Ac-
cording to the Court, the Eleventh Amendment “shows that, on this 
question of the suability of the States by individuals, the highest au-
thority of this country was in accord rather with the minority than 
with the majority of the court in the decision of the case of Chisholm v. 
Georgia.”31  Invoking the Founding-era “views of those great advocates 
and defenders of the Constitution” (Alexander Hamilton, James Madi-
son, and John Marshall),32 the Court concluded that “the cognizance of 
suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was 
not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial 
power of the United States.”33  The Court read the Eleventh Amend-
ment to confirm this understanding: “Can we suppose that, when the 
Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open 
for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts, 
whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, 
was indignantly repelled?”34  The Court viewed this supposition as 
“almost an absurdity on its face.”35 
Since Hans, the Supreme Court has largely adhered to, and even 
expanded, its broad view of state sovereign immunity beyond the 
terms of the Eleventh Amendment.  For example, in Monaco v. Mis-
sissippi,36 the Court held that it lacks “jurisdiction to entertain a suit 
brought by a foreign State against a State without her consent,”37 not-
withstanding Article III’s extension of the judicial power to controver-
sies “between a State . . . and foreign States,”38 and the Eleventh 
Amendment’s conspicuous failure to restrict this jurisdiction.  The 
Court refused to “rest with a mere literal application of the words” of 
Article III or to “assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Id. at 10. 
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. at 12. 
 32 Id. at 14. 
 33 Id. at 15. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.  
 36 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
 37 Id. at 320. 
 38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States.”39  
According to the Court, states are “immune from suits, without their 
consent, save where there has been a surrender of this immunity in the 
plan of the convention.”40  Although the Court found that states sur-
rendered their immunity with respect to suits brought by sister states 
and by the United States,41 it concluded that Article III does not au-
thorize federal courts to adjudicate disputes between a state and a for-
eign state without the “previous consent of the parties.”42 
In the twentieth century, Congress began the novel practice of re-
gulating states as part of its broader legislative agenda, and eventually 
authorized suits by individuals against states to enforce congressional 
commands.  The Supreme Court has generally prevented congressional 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity, first by imposing clear state-
ment rules43 and ultimately by holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida44 that Congress lacks power to do so under Article I, Section 
8.45  Adhering to the purposive approach of Hans, the Court stated 
that the “dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment is directed at a straw man.”46  According to the Court, “we long 
have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment is ‘to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction 
never imagined or dreamed of.’”47 
Alden v. Maine48 demonstrates the depth of the Supreme Court’s 
commitment to the proposition that state sovereign immunity does not 
rest solely on the Eleventh Amendment.49  Alden invalidated a con-
gressional attempt to subject states to suit in state court to enforce 
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 39 Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322. 
 40 Id. at 322–23 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 
487) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 41 Id. at 330. 
 42 Id. at 324 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 557 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinaf-
ter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]). 
 43 See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). 
 44 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 45 At the same time, the Court has permitted Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
under its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 
(1976). 
 46 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69. 
 47 Id. (quoting Monaco, 292 U.S. at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Despite the 
Court’s strong rhetoric, Professor Henry Monaghan points out that Seminole Tribe “in fact left 
firmly in place the fundamental reality of state accountability in federal court for violation of fed-
eral law” because of the continuing availability of suits against state officers.  Henry Paul Mona-
ghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 103 (1996). 
 48 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 49 The decision has drawn criticism because it goes well beyond the text.  See, e.g., Daniel J. 
Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1011, 1047 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1664–75 (2000). 
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claims arising under a federal statute.  Because the Eleventh Amend-
ment concerns only the “[j]udicial power of the United States,”50 the 
plaintiffs argued that the Amendment was inapplicable.  The Court 
stressed that “sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh 
Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution it-
self.”51  According to the Court, the Amendment “confirmed, rather 
than established, sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle.”52  
On this view, “the bare text of the Amendment is not an exhaustive 
description of the States’ constitutional immunity from suit.”53  Rely-
ing on “fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design,”54 
the Court concluded that “the States retain immunity from private suit 
in their own courts,”55 and that Congress lacks “authority under Ar-
ticle I to abrogate” such immunity.56 
B.  The Diversity Theory 
While the immunity theory regards the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment as clearly underinclusive, the diversity theory views it as 
unacceptably overinclusive.  The diversity theory would narrow the 
Amendment’s express prohibition by permitting out-of-state citizens 
and aliens to sue states whenever they can invoke a category of Article 
III jurisdiction other than state-citizen diversity.  On this view, the 
Eleventh Amendment merely prevents federal courts from hearing 
suits against states when jurisdiction is based solely on the presence of 
a diverse citizen or an alien.  Like immunity theorists, diversity theo-
rists use their approach to avoid what they perceive to be the Amend-
ment’s anomalous distinction between in-state and out-of-state citi-
zens.  Applying the Amendment “literally,” they point out, would lead 
to the “unlikely result” that “[a]ll suits brought against a state by an 
out-of-state citizen are prohibited regardless of the existence of a fed-
eral question, but at the same time any suit brought against a state by 
a citizen of that state is permitted, provided a federal question ex-
ists.”57  In their view, the Founders could not have intended this dis-
tinction, so diversity theorists would narrow the Amendment to avoid 
this result. 
Professor William Fletcher and Judge John Gibbons each articu-
lated versions of this theory in 1983, and Justice Brennan (joined by a 
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 50 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 51 Alden, 527 U.S. at 728. 
 52 Id. at 728–29. 
 53 Id. at 736. 
 54 Id. at 729.     
 55 Id. at 754. 
 56 Id. at 741; see also id. at 754.   
 57 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1060–61. 
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minority of the Supreme Court) adopted it two years later.58  Fletcher 
explicitly characterized his project as an attempt to recover the origi-
nal intent of those who drafted and ratified the Eleventh Amend-
ment.59  He argued that the Eleventh Amendment “was intended to 
require that the state-citizen diversity clause of article III be construed 
to confer federal jurisdiction only over disputes in which the state was 
a plaintiff.”60  In other words, “the eleventh amendment forbade noth-
ing, but merely required this limiting construction on the jurisdiction 
granted by the state-citizen diversity clause.”61  On this view, “the 
amendment said nothing about a private citizen’s ability to sue an un-
consenting state under federal question jurisdiction or in admiralty.”62 
Like Professor Fletcher, Judge Gibbons rejected strict application 
of the Eleventh Amendment’s text as contrary to “the probable inten-
tion of its drafters.”63  While acknowledging that “the amendment 
might be read literally to reach all suits by a citizen of one state or for-
eign nation against another state, including federal question claims,”64 
he thought that “a literal reading of the amendment as qualifying ar-
ticle III, § 2 in its entirety would be illogical” because it would mean 
that “a state’s own citizens could sue it although the citizens of other 
states could not.”65  Accordingly, he argued that the Amendment “did 
nothing more than amend article III, section 2 of the Constitution to 
eliminate the power of federal courts to hear suits against states in 
which the sole basis for jurisdiction was the status of the parties.”66  
On this view, the Amendment was little more than “a clever maneuver 
by the Federalists to deflect republican opposition to Chisholm, while 
preserving the power of federal courts to hear claims arising under the 
1783 peace treaty.”67 
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 58 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258–61, 286–87 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  Prior to 1985, Justice Brennan adhered to the “literal wording” of the Amendment, 
which he regarded as “a flat prohibition against the federal judiciary’s entertainment of suits 
against even a consenting State brought by citizens of another State or by aliens.”  Employees v. 
Mo. Pub. Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 310 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 59 See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1037–38. 
 60 Id. at 1035.  This argument is in tension with the text of the Eleventh Amendment, which 
limits the “Judicial power of the United States,” U.S. CONST. amend. XI, not merely “the state-
citizen diversity clause of article III.”  Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1035. 
 61 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1035. 
 62 Id. at 1036.  On the underlying question, Fletcher concluded that “it was unclear whether, 
under the constitutional structure considered as a whole, the states were otherwise immune from 
private suit under federal question and admiralty jurisdiction.”  Id. at 1037; see id. at 1071–72. 
 63 John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1937 n.257 (1983). 
 64 Id.  
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 1894. 
 67 Id. at 2004. 
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 Two years later, Justice Brennan abandoned his literal approach to 
the Eleventh Amendment and embraced the diversity theory.68  In his 
view, scholars had “discovered and collated substantial evidence that 
the Court’s constitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity has 
rested on a mistaken historical premise.”69  Accordingly, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that “the Eleventh Amendment has no relevance” when 
“federal jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal question.”70  
Three additional Justices signed Justice Brennan’s opinion, and (not-
withstanding changes on the Court) at least three Justices have contin-
ued to advocate the diversity theory in dissent.71 
C.  The Compromise Theory 
A third group of commentators has more recently suggested that 
courts should simply accept the text of the Eleventh Amendment as an 
unrecorded compromise rather than try to implement its elusive pur-
pose.  They argue that both the immunity and diversity theories con-
tradict the text of the Amendment in several important respects.  Like 
immunity and diversity theorists, compromise theorists regard the 
Amendment as poorly drafted.  Compromise theorists nonetheless fa-
vor adhering closely to the text in order to uphold whatever compro-
mise is embedded therein.  Accordingly, they take issue with both the 
immunity theory and the diversity theory. 
Compromise theorists like Professor John Manning stress that the 
immunity theory justifies going beyond the text on the ground that 
“the Eleventh Amendment’s purpose was not merely to limit the fed-
eral judicial power in cases involving the party alignments described 
by the Amendment’s precise text, but also to repudiate Chisholm and 
all that it stood for.”72  Using this approach, “the Court has extended 
state sovereign immunity to include federal lawsuits filed by a state’s 
own citizens, by federal corporations, by tribal sovereigns, and by for-
eign nations.”73  Similarly, although the Amendment refers to “any suit 
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 68 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258–61, 286–87 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 69 Id. at 258–59. 
 70 Id. at 301. 
 71 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 109–12 (1996) (Souter, J., joined by Gins-
burg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).  Justice Stevens is at least skeptical of the diversity theory.  See 
id. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There may be room for debate over whether, in light of the 
Eleventh Amendment, Congress has the power to ensure that [a federal] cause of action may be 
enforced in federal court by a citizen of another State or a foreign citizen.”). 
 72 Manning, supra note 9, at 1682. 
 73 Id. at 1666 (footnotes omitted) (citing Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 
781–82 (1991) (upholding sovereign immunity in a suit brought by a tribe against a state); Princi-
pality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331–32 (1934) (holding that sovereign immunity 
bars a suit by a foreign nation against an unconsenting state); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449 
(1900) (recognizing sovereign immunity in a suit by a federal corporation against a state); Hans v. 
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in law or equity,” the Court recognizes sovereign immunity in suits in 
admiralty as well.74  Finally, although the Amendment is written as a 
limitation on the “Judicial power of the United States,” the Court has 
recently ruled that sovereign immunity bars suits against states both in 
state courts75 and before federal administrative agencies.76 
Compromise theorists point out that the diversity theory also looks 
beyond the text by elevating the perceived purpose of the Eleventh 
Amendment over its terms.  At first glance, the diversity theory ap-
pears to be more consistent with the text than the immunity theory be-
cause the former focuses on the parallel language of Article III and the 
Eleventh Amendment.  Indeed, Professor Akhil Amar has gone so far 
as to say that the diversity theory “makes perfect sense of all the words 
of the Amendment itself.”77  Professor Lawrence Marshall points out, 
however, that this purported “allegiance to the text” is at best “partial” 
and therefore “deceptive.”78  In his view, “the diversity theory goes on 
completely to ignore the operative words of the amendment, which 
provide that ‘[t]he judicial power shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity’ that meets the criteria set forth in the 
amendment.”79  The reference to “any suit” signals a more comprehen-
sive prohibition than diversity theorists would allow.  Similarly, the 
Amendment is framed as a restriction on “[t]he Judicial power” and 
therefore limits all forms of jurisdiction recognized by Article III.80  
Thus, by permitting federal courts to hear federal question suits 
against a state by citizens of another state, “the diversity theory does 
precisely what the amendment forbids.”81 
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Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1890) (extending sovereign immunity to a suit by a Louisiana citizen 
against Louisiana)). 
 74 Id.; see, e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). 
 75 Manning, supra note 9, at 1666; see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999). 
 76 Manning, supra note 9, at 1666; see Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 
743, 760–61 (2002).  Textualists like Manning object to these developments because “the specific 
text of the Eleventh Amendment, read in context, appears to convey a negative implication that 
should preclude the derivation of further classes of state sovereign immunity from suit in federal 
court.”  Manning, supra note 9, at 1671; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federal-
ism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1476 (1987) (arguing that the result in Hans “contradict[s] the unambig-
uous limitations of the Eleventh Amendment’s text”). 
 77 Amar, supra note 76, at 1481; see also id. at 1482 (“[I]t would have been difficult to come up 
with wording that expressed better than does the Amendment’s final text a simple desire to effect 
a partial repeal of two technical diverse party grants.”). 
 78 See Marshall, supra note 8, at 1347. 
 79 Id. (alteration in original). 
 80 See Massey, supra note 7, at 65 (concluding that the Eleventh Amendment “sought to create 
a party based denial of jurisdiction to the federal courts that sweeps across all the jurisdictional 
heads of Article III”). 
 81 Marshall, supra note 8, at 1347; see also William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the 
Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1380 (1989) (“The text of 
the eleventh amendment does not limit its protection to suits based upon diversity; its language 
applies to all suits, whether based on diversity or federal question jurisdiction.”).  For Fletcher’s 
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Because they agree with immunity and diversity theorists that the 
Eleventh Amendment does not make perfect sense, compromise theo-
rists conclude that the Amendment must reflect an unrecorded com-
promise rather than a coherent approach to state suability.  For exam-
ple, Marshall argues that “the distinctions that the amendment so 
clearly draws can be understood as efforts to accommodate the com-
peting values of state immunity from federal suit and state accounta-
bility within the constitutional system.”82  He hypothesizes that states 
were most concerned with suits by out-of-state citizens (rather than 
their own citizens) because out-of-state speculators had purchased dis-
puted western lands and state war debts at deep discounts.83  Al-
though Marshall acknowledges that at least some in-state citizens had 
similar claims, he suggests that states may have found compensating 
their own citizens less objectionable.84 
Manning also believes that the Supreme Court should enforce “the 
Eleventh Amendment as written.”85  He argues that even if one as-
sumes that there was a broad consensus in favor of comprehensive 
state sovereign immunity, “the mere existence of a social or political 
consensus contrary to the text cannot carry the heavy burden required 
to justify deviating from such a text, especially in constitutional law.”86  
The reason is that “the Article V amendment process does not seam-
lessly translate . . . even widespread social sentiment into law.”87  
Thus, “it is conceivable that one-third of either house (or, less likely, 
one-quarter of the state legislatures) might have preferred the narrower 
immunity embedded in the text.”88  In other words, the Amendment 
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response, see William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Re-
ply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989). 
 82 Marshall, supra note 8, at 1345. 
 83 Id. at 1362–66. 
 84 See id. at 1366.  Marshall recognizes that his defense of the text does pose at least one “per-
plexing problem” — namely, assignment of claims to in-state citizens.  Id. at 1367 n.113.  Marshall 
acknowledges that the Supreme Court would likely uphold such assignments.  See id.  He sug-
gests that the ratifiers of the Eleventh Amendment may have either considered this a “small loop-
hole[]” or assumed that courts would not “allow plaintiffs to circumvent the amendment by as-
signing debts to eligible plaintiffs.”  Id.  This suggestion seems implausible given that the prospect 
of suits by out-of-state citizens against states arose because in-state citizens sold their bonds to 
out-of-state speculators.  Id. at 1365–66.  If these initial assignments were valid, there is little rea-
son to think that courts would disallow reassignments to in-state citizens. 
 85 Manning, supra note 9, at 1722. 
 86 Id. at 1720.  But see Steven Menashi, Article III as a Constitutional Compromise: Modern 
Textualism and State Sovereign Immunity, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135 (2009) (arguing that 
textualists should honor the inherent compromise contained in Article III by upholding a back-
ground principle of state sovereign immunity). 
 87 Manning, supra note 9, at 1720. 
 88 Id. 
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may represent “the fruits of a (potentially unrecorded) compromise.”89  
Indeed, Manning does not “think it possible ever to know the true rea-
son, if one exists, for the final shape of the Amendment’s text.”90  As 
explained in Part II, however, there is a largely forgotten historical 
context that helps to explain why the text of the Amendment would 
have made sense to those who adopted it.91 
D.  The Inadequacy of Current Theories 
All major theories of the Eleventh Amendment — the immunity 
theory, the diversity theory, and the compromise theory — start from 
the assumption that the Amendment is either poorly drafted or 
represents an awkward compromise.  Given the history of the 
Amendment’s adoption, neither proposition rings true.  The Hans 
Court considered the Amendment to be underinclusive in relation to 
its apparent background purpose of restoring comprehensive state sov-
ereign immunity.  The diversity theory similarly builds on the presup-
position that the text of the Amendment is overinclusive in relation to 
its assumed purpose of eliminating only state-citizen diversity jurisdic-
tion under Article III.  Thus, both theories draw on the doctrine of 
strong purposivism to make a claim of inadvertent drafting.92  Even 
the leading textualist theories do not regard the Amendment as reflect-
ing the considered expression of a coherent policy, but assume that it 
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 89 Id. at 1721.  Professor Andrew Coan also advocates following the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment.  Because there is no “perfectly satisfying explanation” for the text’s distinction be-
tween out-of-state and in-state citizens, he believes that courts should follow the text in order to 
end the costly war between the immunity and diversity theories.  Coan, supra note 9, at 2532. 
 90 Manning, supra note 9, at 1722.  Professor Thomas Lee has recently suggested that a literal 
reading of the Eleventh Amendment makes sense in light of principles of international law known 
to the Founders.  See Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International 
Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027 (2002).  Specifically, he argues that the 
Amendment “is essentially just a negative formulation of the affirmative international law rule” 
that “only states have rights against other states.”  Id. at 1028.   
 91 Professor Caleb Nelson has recently argued that “many members of the Founding genera-
tion thought that a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ did not exist unless both sides either voluntarily ap-
peared or could be haled before the court.”  Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2002).  Because traditionally “courts could 
not command unconsenting states to appear at the behest of an individual,” a state’s failure to 
consent meant that “there would be no ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’” under Article III.  Id.  In effect, 
Nelson maintains that there was no “Case” because federal courts lacked personal jurisdiction 
over unconsenting states.  Id.  The Eleventh Amendment took a different approach by withdraw-
ing subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by prohibited plaintiffs against states.  Id. at 
1566.  Nelson suggests that the Supreme Court’s failure to distinguish between these two types of 
immunity has contributed to doctrinal confusion.  Id.  
 92 Cf. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454–55 (1989); Church of the Holy 
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
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represents the fruits of an awkward compromise, which must be en-
forced as written even if it does not make much sense.93 
Immunity and diversity theorists implicitly rely on the idea that the 
Eleventh Amendment as written produces “absurd results” that the 
Supreme Court is justified in rectifying.  The absurdity doctrine per-
mits courts to ignore a legal text when its application leads to absurd 
results.  The doctrine is based on the idea that lawmakers often draft 
in haste, act with imperfect foresight, and write laws in unavoidably 
imprecise language.94  Hence, where a law’s conventional meaning is 
dramatically at odds with some broadly and deeply held social value 
(such as the immunity of the states from suit or the enforcement of 
federal law), an interpreter presumes that the result was an unintended 
failure of expression by the lawmaker.  On this view, it serves rather 
than disserves legislative supremacy for courts to approximate what 
the lawmaker would have done if the offending application had come 
to its attention.95  In this vein, immunity and diversity theorists  
would expand or contract the immunity conveyed by the text of  
the Eleventh Amendment in order to bring it into line with their views 
of its true purpose.  Textualists would enforce the Amendment as writ-
ten, but only on the assumption that the text represents an awkward 
compromise. 
None of these presuppositions seems persuasive in this context.  
First, the Eleventh Amendment does not fit the usual profile for ab-
surdity.  Typically, absurdity involves an overgeneralization that pro-
duces results that the drafters could not have anticipated.96  While ab-
surdity might also include an omitted case,97 it seems unlikely that the 
Amendment was the product of inadvertent drafting.  The question of 
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 93 Cf. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“Compromises draw unprincipled lines between situations that strike an outside observer as  
all but identical. The limitation is part of the price of the victory achieved, a concession to oppo-
nents who might have been able to delay or block a bill even slightly more favorable to the  
proponents.”). 
 94 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2400–02 (2003). 
 95 See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 172 (1896) (holding that “an 
absurdity cannot be imputed to the legislature”); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 
396 (1868) (noting that courts have authority to correct “absurdity, which the legislature ought not 
to be presumed to have intended”); see also E. Russell Hopkins, The Literal Canon and the Gol-
den Rule, 15 CANADIAN B. REV. 689, 692 (1937) (describing absurdity as an “extreme departure 
from commonly accepted principles of morality, philsophy, politics, or convenience”). 
 96 See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. 457 (finding it absurd to apply a broad prohi-
bition against importation of persons to perform “labor or service of any kind” to a pastor hired to 
minister to a congregation); United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868) (finding a prohibi-
tion on obstruction of the mail absurd as applied to a local law enforcement officer who arrested a 
mail carrier for murder while the latter was delivering mail). 
 97 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (finding it absurd to permit indi-
viduals, but not corporations, to take advantage of expedited review provisions governing chal-
lenges to the Line Item Veto Act). 
2010] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1837 
sovereign immunity had been much debated by a sophisticated politi-
cal community both before and after ratification.  In the view of many, 
an amendment was necessitated by the Convention’s careless drafting 
of Article III.  Although the Hans Court described the Amendment as 
reflecting the swift reaction to a shock of surprise that swept the na-
tion, in fact the final version of the Amendment was not adopted until 
the next session of Congress, after several alternatives had been  
considered.98 
Second, although in some sense all laws represent a compromise of 
sorts,99 it seems odd to suggest that the Eleventh Amendment 
represented the awkward compromise typically associated with sharp-
ly divided forces.  The commentary and debates surrounding the 
Amendment show no sign of real disagreement concerning either the 
goal of the Amendment or its scope.  Indeed, it is undisputed that Fed-
eralists — whose express representations about Article III were over-
ridden by the Court in Chisholm — joined Antifederalists in both call-
ing for an amendment and passing it by overwhelming margins in 
both the House and the Senate.100  Of course, it is true that compro-
mises often occur outside the glare of public view and that “[i]t is not 
the law that [an adopted text] can have no effects which are not explic-
itly mentioned in its legislative history.”101  It seems telling, however, 
that on an issue as important and contentious as this one, there is no 
evidence of major divisions of political opinion as to how far the 
Amendment should go. 
The impetus behind all three theories is that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not give a satisfactory account of federal question jurisdic-
tion.  The problem, however, does not stem from our understanding of 
the Amendment, but rather from the faulty assumption that the nature 
of the Union permitted individuals to sue states using federal question 
jurisdiction.  My hypothesis is that the Eleventh Amendment, in fact, 
did what everyone expected it to do — to reaffirm the absence of judi-
cial power to hear suits by individuals against states — when under-
stood in light of widely shared beliefs about the limits of federal power 
and the proper means of enforcing constitutional prohibitions against 
states.  That understanding may have been lost even by the time the 
Court decided Hans in 1890.  At the time the Amendment was 
adopted, however, no one suggested that it was over- or underinclusive 
in relation to the apparent goal of restoring the preferred pre-Chisholm 
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 98 See infra section IV.C, pp. 1891–94. 
 99 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 125 (1999). 
 100 For example, Massachusetts Federalists Theodore Sedgwick and Caleb Strong played key 
roles in the drafting and congressional passage of the Amendment. See infra sections IV.B and C, 
pp. 1886–94. 
 101 Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988). 
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understanding of Article III.  The reason appears to be that virtually 
all participants in framing and adopting the Amendment shared the 
same background assumptions — that the Constitution conferred no 
power on the federal government to regulate or coerce states, and that 
the Constitution imposed no affirmative obligations on states necessi-
tating suits by individuals against states.  Only an express constitu-
tional provision authorizing suits against states would suffice to over-
ride these assumptions.  The Founders debated whether the state-
citizen diversity clauses of Article III expressly authorized such suits, 
and the Chisholm Court subsequently construed them to do so.  There 
was no similar debate regarding federal question jurisdiction.  In light 
of this background, the Eleventh Amendment as written offered a 
complete and coherent solution to the problem posed by the state-
citizen diversity provisions of Article III — the only provisions of the 
Constitution that anyone ever suggested might expressly authorize in-
dividuals to sue states. 
III.  THE LOST HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Taken in historical context, the Eleventh Amendment should not be 
understood as the product of an incoherent compromise or faulty 
drafting.  Rather, one can make sense of the Amendment as written if 
it is read against the backdrop of the Founders’ deeply and widely 
held understanding that the Constitution did not authorize Congress 
either to enact legislation for states or to coerce state compliance with 
federal commands.  This understanding emerged from the difficulties 
that the Founders experienced under the Articles of Confederation, 
and was offered repeatedly during the Philadelphia Convention and 
the ratification debates as one of the Constitution’s primary advan-
tages over competing proposals to amend the Articles. 
In drafting and ratifying the Constitution, prominent Founders 
consistently maintained that the nature of the Union was such that 
federal commands could be enforced only against individuals, but not 
against states.  To understand this, one must revisit the central debate 
over whether to revise the Articles or adopt an entirely new Constitu-
tion.  The Articles, of course, authorized Congress to requisition mon-
ey, supplies, and personnel from the states, but provided no means of 
enforcement.  The Founders considered, but did not adopt, proposals 
to amend the Articles to give Congress express power to use military 
force to coerce delinquent states to comply with requisitions.  Similar 
proposals were made at the Constitutional Convention, but were re-
jected because the delegates feared that the use of such a power would 
lead to a civil war.  The Convention avoided this danger by making 
the fundamental decision — which some regard as the genius of the 
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Constitution — to substitute individuals for states as the objects of 
congressional power. 
During the ratification debates, leading Federalists emphasized this 
feature of the Constitution as its primary advantage over proposals to 
retain the Articles of Confederation.  Federalists and Antifederalists 
alike ultimately agreed that the Articles could not be salvaged without 
introducing coercive power against states — a power that the Found-
ers widely regarded as impracticable, cruel, and unjust.  Accordingly, 
they decided to abandon the Articles and adopt a constitution in its 
place that could be enforced solely against individuals.  This back-
ground helps to make sense of the Eleventh Amendment because it 
suggests (a) that the Founders did not understand federal question ju-
risdiction to encompass coercive suits by individuals against states, 
and (b) that the Founders regarded the Amendment as sufficient to 
implement the widely held view that individuals should not be able to 
sue states in federal court. 
A.  The Articles of Confederation 
On June 12, 1776, the Continental Congress authorized a commit-
tee to prepare a plan of confederation.102  Serious problems arose un-
der the Articles of Confederation even before they were approved by 
all thirteen states.  A crucial issue was how Congress would raise suffi-
cient revenue to pay for national defense and the general welfare.  On 
paper, the Articles obligated the states to supply whatever requisitions 
Congress demanded.103  According to Article XIII, “Every state shall 
abide by the determinations of the united states in congress assembled, 
on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them.”104  
In practice, however, the lack of any enforcement mechanism left 
states free both to second guess the necessity of requisitions and to pay 
less than their full quota.105  The states’ inability or refusal to comply 
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 102 See 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
53 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter 1 DHRC]. 
 103 Article VIII provided that federal expenses “shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, 
which shall be supplied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land within each 
state.”  Draft of the Articles of Confederation (July 12, 1776), in 1 DHRC, supra note 102, at 79, 
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by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states within the time agreed upon 
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 104 ACT OF CONFEDERATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Nov. 15, 1777), re-
printed in 1 DHRC, supra note 102, at 86, 93. 
 105 As Alexander Hamilton remarked, the states’ “jealousy of all power not in their own 
hands . . . has led them to exercise a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recom-
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ALEXANDER HAMILTON 1779–1781, at 400, 401 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961) [hereinafter 
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fully with federal requisitions was notorious during the Confederation 
era.106 
By 1780, Congress recognized the need to amend the Articles to 
confer additional powers, particularly with respect to raising revenue.  
Congress considered two basic approaches: empower Congress to by-
pass the states by imposing taxes directly or empower Congress to 
coerce states to comply with requisitions.  Congress proposed the first 
approach on February 3, 1781,107 but this proposal died in 1782 when 
Rhode Island refused to ratify the amendment and Virginia rescinded 
its earlier approval.108  More importantly for present purposes, Con-
gress also considered several proposals to use military force to coerce 
state compliance with requisitions. 
The movement began in 1780 in response to a notorious incident.  
General Washington petitioned Congress for resources to launch an of-
fensive to recapture New York City from the British.109  Congress req-
uisitioned money from the states, but failed to receive sufficient 
funds.110  Washington cancelled the offensive, and Governor Clinton 
responded by seeking an amendment to the Articles that would em-
power Congress to coerce state compliance with requisitions.  The 
New York General Assembly proposed amending the Articles by  
providing: 
[W]henever it shall appear to [Congress], that any State is deficient in fur-
nishing the Quota of Men, Money, Provisions or other Supplies, required 
of such State, that Congress direct the Commander in Chief, without De-
lay, to march the Army or such Part of it as may be requisite, into such 
State, and by a Military Force, compel it to furnish its Deficiency.111 
The New York Assembly sent its proposal not only to Congress, 
but also to the upcoming Hartford Convention of five northeastern 
states, which met on November 8, 1780 to consider defects in the  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
HAMILTON PAPERS].  See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, 
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CONFEDERATION 66 (2001). 
 110 Id. at 67–68. 
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Union.112  The convention endorsed a variation of the New York pro-
posal, which would have authorized the Commander in Chief to in-
itiate military action to enforce state compliance with requisitions, but 
only during the years 1780 and 1781.113  Even this proposal was met 
with alarm in some quarters.114  The speaker of the Massachusetts as-
sembly remarked that military coercion ran contrary to “the Principles 
on which our Opposition to Britain rests.”115  Although he regarded 
General Washington as “a Good and a Great Man,” he cautioned that 
“he is only a Man and therefore should not be vested with such  
powers.”116 
The proceedings of the Hartford Convention were presented to 
Congress on December 12, 1780, and assigned to a five member com-
mittee that included James Madison.117  Although Madison favored 
empowering Congress to coerce the states, he was outvoted.118  One of 
the prevailing members of the committee wrote to the Governor of 
New Jersey that the “resolution is of such a nature that I should never 
give my voice for it.”119  He also predicted that General Washington 
would not “accept or act in consequence of such powers.”120 
Congress appointed Madison to another committee on March 6, 
1781 “to prepare a plan to invest the United States in Congress assem-
bled with full and explicit powers for effectually carrying into execu-
tion in the several states all acts or resolutions passed agreeably to the 
Articles of Confederation.”121  This time, Madison’s views prevailed.122  
On March 16, 1781, the committee proposed that Congress be given 
authority to compel state compliance with requisitions through mili-
tary force.123  The report (written largely by Madison) initially sug-
gested that Congress might already have implied power under the Ar-
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ticles to coerce states,124 but concluded that it is “most consonant to 
the spirit of a free constitution that on the one hand all exercise of 
power should be explicitly and precisely warranted, and on the other 
that the penal consequences of a violation of duty should be clearly 
promulgated and understood.”125  Accordingly, the report proposed 
amending the Articles of Confederation as follows: 
 It is understood & hereby declared that in case any one or more of the 
Confederated States shall refuse or neglect to abide by the determinations 
of the United States in Congress assembled or to observe all the Articles of 
Confederation as required in the 13th. Article, the said United States in 
Congress assembled are fully authorised to employ the force of the United 
States as well by sea as by land to compel such State or States to fulfill 
their federal engagements, and particularly to make distraint on any of the 
effects Vessels and Merchandizes of such State or States of any of the Citi-
zens thereof wherever found, and to prohibit and prevent their trade and 
intercourse as well with any other of the United States and the Citizens 
thereof, as with any foreign State, and as well by land as by sea, until full 
compensation or compliance be obtained with respect to all Requisitions 
made by the United States in Congress assembled in pursuance of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.126 
Despite Madison’s endorsement,127 Congress never proposed an am-
endment of this kind to the states.128 
Alexander Hamilton may have reflected the general unease over  
recommending coercive power against the states when he warned in 
1782 that the grant of such authority might lead to a civil war: 
A mere regard to the interests of the confederacy will never be a principle 
sufficiently active to curb the ambition and intrigues of different members.  
Force cannot effect it: A contest of arms will seldom be between the com-
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mon sovereign and a single refractory member; but between distinct com-
binations of the several parts against each other.129 
Congress entertained no further proposals of this kind during the Con-
federation, and none was ever submitted to the states for ratification. 
B.  The Constitutional Convention 
Although the Constitutional Convention considered conferring fed-
eral power to coerce states, the idea was quickly put aside.  The dele-
gates regarded the introduction of such power to be dangerous to the 
Union (because it could cause a civil war) and unjust (because it would 
punish innocent citizens along with the guilty).  The Convention 
avoided the need to authorize coercive power against states by design-
ing a Constitution that conferred legislative power over individuals ra-
ther than states, and thus avoided the need for coercive power over 
states. 
Prior to the Convention, Madison described the lack of coercive 
power over states as one of the primary vices of the existing system: 
A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Govern-
ment.  The federal system being destitute of both, wants the great vital 
principles of a Political Constitution.  Under the form of such a Constitu-
tion, it is in fact nothing more than a treaty of amity of commerce and of 
alliance, between independent and Sovereign States.130 
Madison lamented that because acts of Congress depend “for their ex-
ecution on the will of the State legislatures,” they are “nominally au-
thoritative, [but] in fact recommendatory only.”131 
On April 16, 1787, Madison wrote to George Washington to share 
some “outlines of a new system.”132  In addition to proposing federal 
power to regulate trade, tax imports and exports, and negative state 
laws,133 Madison stated that “the right of coercion should be expressly 
declared” and could be exerted “either by sea or land.”134  For the first 
time, however, Madison acknowledged the potential dangers of confer-
ring coercive power over states.  He observed that “the difficulty & 
awkwardness of operating by force on the collective will of a State, 
render it particularly desirable that the necessity of it might be pre-
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 129 Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. VI (July 4, 1782), reprinted in 3 HAMILTON 
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cluded.”135  He speculated that “[p]erhaps the negative on the laws [of 
the states] might . . . answer this purpose.”136  More importantly, he 
suggested that permitting the central government to raise revenue di-
rectly by giving it “defined objects of taxation” might avoid the need to 
rely on coercive power.137 
Notwithstanding these reservations, Madison included power to  
regulate and coerce states in the Virginia Plan.  As introduced at the 
Convention, the Plan provided that “the National Legislature ought to 
be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by 
the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the 
separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the Unit-
ed States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legisla-
tion.”138  In Madison’s view (formed throughout the 1780s), transfer-
ring Congress’s existing power to impose affirmative obligations on the 
states would necessitate vesting the Legislature with an express power 
of coercion.  Accordingly, the Virginia Plan proposed that the National 
Legislature be empowered “to call forth the force of the Union agst. 
any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles 
thereof.”139 
George Mason immediately objected to such power.  According to 
Madison, Mason admitted that the present confederation was “defi-
cient in not providing for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent 
States; but he argued very cogently that punishment could not <in the 
nature of things be executed on> the States collectively, and therefore 
that such a Govt. was necessary as could directly operate on individu-
als, and would punish those only whose guilt required it.”140  These 
arguments caused Madison to reconsider his position: 
Mr. M<adison>, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, 
the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it 
when applied to people collectively and not individually.  — , A Union of 
States <containing such an ingredient> seemed to provide for its own de-
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struction.  The use of force agst. a State, would look more like a declara-
tion of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be con-
sidered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by 
which it might be bound.  He hoped that such a system would be framed 
as might render this recourse unnecessary, and moved that the clause be 
postponed.141 
The Convention granted the postponement and proceeded to con-
sider abandoning the Articles of Confederation in favor of an entirely 
new system.  As Mason explained: “Under the existing Confederacy, 
Congs. represent the States not the people of the States: their acts op-
erate on the States not on the individuals.  The case will be changed in 
the new plan of Govt.”142  Based on this early exchange, the Conven-
tion assumed that the “national government had to be reconstituted 
with power to enact, execute, and adjudicate its own laws, acting di-
rectly on the American people, without having to rely on the coopera-
tion of the states.”143  Giving Congress legislative power over individ-
uals rather than states eliminated the need to give the new government 
power to coerce states.144 
On June 15, 1787, William Paterson proposed the New Jersey Plan 
as a complete alternative to the Virginia Plan.145  Paterson’s Plan 
sought only to “revise[], correct[] & enlarge[]” the Articles of Confedera-
tion rather than to discard them for an entirely new system.146  In ad-
dition to giving Congress more power, the New Jersey Plan expressly 
empowered the federal executive to enforce the Articles against states 
by military force.147  In the Committee of the Whole, Paterson argued 
that abandoning the Articles of Confederation went beyond “the pow-
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ers of the Convention,”148 and that drawing representatives “imme-
diately from the States, not from the people” was necessary to main-
tain “the sovereignty of the States.”149  Edmund Randolph responded 
by defending the Virginia Plan and by painting “in strong colours, the 
imbecility of the existing confederacy, & the danger of delaying a sub-
stantial reform”:150 
The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or intro-
duce the national plan.  The insufficiency of the former has been fully dis-
played by the trial already made.  There are but two modes, by which the 
end of a Genl. Govt. can be attained: the 1st. is by coercion as proposed 
by Mr. Ps. plan.  2. by real legislation as propd. by the other plan.  Coer-
cion he pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals.  It 
tended also to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in 
the spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequently trained them up for 
the service of Ambition.  We must resort therefore to a national Legisla-
tion over individuals, for which [the existing] Congs. are unfit.151 
The introduction of the New Jersey Plan presented the Convention 
with a stark choice: retain and amend the Articles of Confederation 
(by authorizing coercive power over states) or abandon them in favor 
of an entirely new system (that would coerce individuals rather than 
states).  At the next session, Alexander Hamilton acknowledged that 
the Virginia Plan “departs itself from the federal idea, as understood by 
some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals.”152  Nonetheless, 
he agreed with Randolph “that we owed it to our Country, to do on 
this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness.”153  
Hamilton distinguished between “coertion of laws” and “coertion of 
arms,”154 and denied that force could ever be used against states: “But 
how can this force be exerted on the States collectively.  It is impossi-
ble.  It amounts to a war between the parties.  Foreign powers also 
will not be idle spectators.  They will interpose, the confusion will in-
crease, and a dissolution of the Union ensue.”155 
Now firmly opposed to coercive power, Madison offered a similar 
critique.  He asked the smaller states most attached to the New Jersey 
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Plan “to consider the situation in which it would leave them.”156  Mad-
ison explained: “The coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan de-
pends, can never be exerted but on themselves.  The larger States will 
be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it.”157  After 
Madison spoke, the Convention rejected the New Jersey Plan (and 
coercive power) and re-reported the Virginia Plan (without coercive 
power).158 
Dissatisfied with this result, John Lansing urged adherence to “the 
foundation of the present Confederacy”159 by vesting “the powers of 
Legislation . . . <in the U. States> in Congress.”160  Mason responded 
by expanding upon his original objections to coercive power: 
It was acknowledged by (Mr. Patterson) that his plan could not be en-
forced without military coertion.  Does he consider the force of this con-
cession.  The most jarring elements of nature; fire & water themselves are 
not more incompatible tha[n] such a mixture of civil liberty and military 
execution.  Will the militia march from one State to another, in order to 
collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the Republic?  
Will they maintain an army for this purpose?  Will not the citizens of the 
invaded State assist one another till they rise as one Man, and shake off 
the Union altogether. . . . In one point of view he was struck with horror 
at the prospect of recurring to this expedient.  To punish the non-payment 
of taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by de[s]potism itself: 
yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to a military collec-
tion of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no discrimination be-
tween the innocent and the guilty.161   
Following Mason’s impassioned speech, the Convention rejected Lan-
sing’s proposal.162 
With the Convention firmly against any plan that would introduce 
coercive power against states, the debate turned to one of the most 
contentious issues of the Convention: the basis for representation in 
the Senate.  Some delegates thought this issue should be determined in 
accordance with the Convention’s decision to replace Congress’s exist-
ing power over states with novel power over individuals.  The states 
had equal representation in Congress under the Articles, and the Ar-
ticles acted only on states.  Delegates like James Madison now argued 
that because the proposed Constitution would give Congress legislative 
power over individuals rather than states, Congress should be appor-
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tioned by population.  In the end, the delegates compromised by 
adopting proportional representation in the House and giving states 
equal suffrage in the Senate.163 
Not surprisingly, delegates from large states favored proportional 
representation in the Senate, while small state delegates favored equal 
suffrage.  In the course of a protracted and heated debate, a few dele-
gates suggested that equal suffrage was appropriate because the gov-
ernment would sometimes act on states.  For example, William Davie 
remarked that “We were partly federal, partly national in our Union.  
And he did not see why the Govt. might (not) in some respects operate 
on the States, in others on the people.”164  Madison denied that the 
“Governt. would (in its operation) be partly federal, partly national.”165  
If true, the observation would favor the following compromise: 
In all cases where the Genl. Governt. is to act on the people, let the people 
be represented and the votes be proportional.  In all cases where the  
Governt. is to act on the States as such, in like manner as Congs. now act 
on them, let the States be represented & the votes be equal.166 
Madison, however, denied the premise underlying such a compromise.  
“He called for a single instance in which the Genl. Govt. was not to 
operate on the people individually.”167  In addition, he stressed that 
“[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the 
States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands.”168 
The Convention ultimately broke the deadlock over representation 
in the Senate by appointing a committee to devise a compromise.169  
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 163 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421 (2008). 
 164 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 481, 488. 
 165 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 2, 8. 
 166 Id. at 8–9.  
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general legislature “ought to be empowered to carry their own plans into execution, if the States 
should fail to supply their respective quotas.”  Id. 
 168 Id. at 9.  During ratification, Madison acknowledged that there are “some instances” in 
which “the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters.”  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 250.  The example he gave in The 
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legislative powers,” Nelson, supra note 91, at 1644 n.363, but to controversies between states (such 
as boundary disputes) brought “in their collective and political capacities” in the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 245.  
Madison thought such jurisdiction “essential to prevent an appeal to the sword,” id. at 246, and 
thus distinguished suits between states from suits against states by individuals.  See infra notes 
300–301 and accompanying text. 
 169 See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 2, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 510, 510. 
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After resolving this issue, the Convention rejected congressional power 
to negative state laws.170  In its place, the Convention adopted the Su-
premacy Clause, which obligated courts to recognize federal laws and 
treaties as “supreme law” notwithstanding contrary state law.171  Un-
like the original Virginia Plan, the plan that emerged from the Com-
mittee of Detail did not transfer and expand “the Legislative Rights 
vested in Congress by the Confederation.”172  Rather, it gave the “Leg-
islature of the United States” novel powers to act directly on individu-
als.173  Thus, in place of the power to requisition funds from states, the 
plan gave Congress “the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts 
and excises.”174  The remainder of the proposed powers closely tracked 
those ultimately granted by Article I, Section 8.  Absent from this 
enumeration was any legislative power to regulate states or any  
power to use force against states to coerce their compliance with feder-
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 170 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
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Gorham, Edmund Randolph, John Rutledge, and James Wilson. 
 173 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 177, 181. 
 174 Id. (emphasis added).  Given the Founders’ rejection of coercive power, it seems safe to as-
sume that they understood the federal taxing power — like all federal legislative powers — to op-
erate on individuals rather than states.  Some Founders nonetheless raised concerns regarding 
Congress’s ability to collect direct taxes, as opposed to duties, imposts, and excises.  The Constitu-
tion requires “direct Taxes” to “be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their 
respective Numbers.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  By contrast, the Constitution provides that 
“all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 1.  Elbridge Gerry initially objected that the principle of direct taxation “could not be 
carried into execution as the States were not to be taxed as States.”  See James Madison, Notes on 
the Constitutional Convention (July 12, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 
591, 597.  Oliver Ellsworth replied that “[t]he sum allotted to a State may be levied without diffi-
culty according to the plan used by the State in raising its own supplies.”  Id.  Luther Martin later 
proposed requiring Congress to proceed initially by requisitions whenever it sought to raise reve-
nue by direct taxes.  See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 21, 1787), 
in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 355, 359.  Martin did not, however, propose giv-
ing Congress power to coerce delinquent states.  Rather, he proposed that if states failed to com-
ply with requisitions, “then and then only” could Congress bypass the states and “devise and pass 
acts directing the mode, and authorizing the collection of the same.”  Id.  The Convention rejected 
Martin’s proposal without debate by a vote of 8 to 1.  Id.  During ratification, Antifederalists 
raised objections to direct taxes, and Madison sought to reassure them by suggesting that when-
ever Congress imposed such taxes, it would probably give states the option “to supply their quotas 
by previous collections of their own” before proceeding to collect the tax directly.  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 292.  In practice, Congress rarely im-
posed direct taxes (because of the difficulty of apportionment) and relied almost exclusively on 
duties, imposts, and excises to raise federal revenue until the adoption of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment and the introduction of the income tax. 
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al commands.175  As Madison had hoped, the fundamental decision to 
give Congress legislative power over individuals rather than states  
had rendered the introduction of coercive power against states  
unnecessary.176 
The Constitution does, of course, contain several important prohi-
bitions both on the United States177 and on the states.178  For example, 
the Committee of Detail proposed that “No state shall coin money; nor 
grant letters of marque and reprisals; nor enter into any treaty, al-
liance, or confederation; nor grant any title of Nobility.”179  The Con-
vention added several more restrictions, including prohibitions on is-
suing bills of credit, making anything but gold and silver a tender in 
payment of debts, and impairing the obligations of contracts.  These 
various restrictions eventually became Article I, Section 10 of the  
Constitution.   
If these prohibitions could be enforced only through coercive suits 
against states, then Article I, Section 10 would contradict Madison’s 
repeated assertions that the Constitution neither conferred nor re-
quired coercive power over states.  This apparent contradiction disap-
pears, however, if these prohibitions could be effectively enforced ei-
ther by suits between individuals (including suits against state officers) 
or through the assertion of federal defenses in suits initiated by states.  
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 175 Although Randolph did not sign the Constitution, he agreed with the fundamental decision 
to replace regulation of states with regulation of individuals: “But although coercion is an indis-
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.  Given the Founders’ desire to avoid civil war, however, this power 
was almost certainly limited to enforcing federal statutes against individuals (as opposed to 
states). 
 177 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 178 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 179 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 28, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 439 n.14. 
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The Founders were familiar with these mechanisms, and reliance on 
such indirect means of enforcement was consistent with background 
notions of sovereign immunity and the Founders’ decision to avoid re-
liance on federal power to coerce states. 
 Thus, contrary to modern assumptions, the Founders did not neces-
sarily assume that an individual could sue a state in federal court to 
enforce constitutional prohibitions against states.  Rather, they may 
well have assumed that such prohibitions would be enforced in the 
same way as Article I, Section 9’s similar prohibitions on the United 
States — in suits against individuals (including government officials) 
or as a defense in suits brought by the government.180  For example, if 
Congress enacted a “Tax or Duty . . . on Articles exported from any 
State,”181 the Founders would not have necessarily assumed that indi-
viduals could sue the United States directly.  Rather, they may have 
assumed that an individual could challenge the tax either by suing the 
collector in his individual capacity, or by refusing to pay the tax and 
invoking the Constitution as a defense in any enforcement action.182 
Similarly, if a state made paper money a legal tender in violation of 
Article I, Section 10, individuals could have enforced their rights with-
out resort to suits against states.  In particular, a creditor presumably 
could have refused the tender and sued the debtor to recover the debt.  
If the debtor invoked the (unconstitutional) state law as a defense, the 
creditor could prevail by invoking the Constitution.  The Supremacy 
Clause obligated state judges to disregard state law in such cases, and 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction allowed it to enforce the 
supremacy of federal law.  This method avoided federal enforcement of 
constitutional prohibitions directly against states.  Whatever one 
thinks of these enforcement methods today, Federalists maintained 
throughout ratification that the Constitution could be enforced without 
permitting individuals to sue states and, even more emphatically, 
without giving the federal government coercive power over states. 
The Committee of Detail, however, did produce at least one pro-
posal that threatened to undermine the Federalists’ core argument for 
preferring the Constitution to the Articles of Confederation.  In what 
would become part of Article III, the Committee proposed that the 
federal judicial power extend to controversies “between a State and 
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 180 See infra notes 497–528 and accompanying text.  Although there is no direct evidence of 
how the Founders expected Article I, Section 10 to be enforced, it suffices for present purposes to 
observe that these restrictions could be enforced in ordinary common law actions between indi-
viduals.  The availability of such suits might explain why — despite Article I, Section 10 — the 
Founders continued to state publicly that the proposed Constitution could be enforced against 
individuals rather than states.  See infra section III.C, pp. 1853–62. 
 181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
 182 See infra section V.B, pp. 1899-1911. 
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Citizens of another State,” and “between a State . . . and foreign . . . 
citizens or subjects.”183  This language was adopted relatively late in 
the Convention without objection or discussion.184  Madison later re-
marked that this part of the Constitution might have been “better ex-
pressed,”185 but at the time the ambiguity apparently went unnoticed.  
During the ratification debates, Antifederalists charged that the citi-
zen-state diversity provisions of Article III expressly authorized indi-
viduals to sue states in federal court and necessarily implied federal 
power to coerce state compliance with any resulting judgments.  These 
suggestions contradicted the Federalists’ principal argument for aban-
doning the Articles in favor of the Constitution.  To quiet fears about 
suits against states and maintain the integrity of their case for the 
Constitution, leading Federalists (including Hamilton, Madison, and 
Marshall) denied the Antifederalists’ construction of Article III, and 
argued that it should be construed to extend federal judicial power on-
ly to suits in which a state was the plaintiff.186 
Following the Convention, Madison forwarded the proposed Con-
stitution to Thomas Jefferson.  Madison went out of his way to explain 
that the Constitution empowered Congress to regulate individuals ra-
ther than states, and thus did not authorize coercive power against 
states: 
It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could not be secured 
by any system founded on the principle of a confederation of Sovereign 
States.  A voluntary observance of the federal law by all the members 
could never be hoped for.  A compulsive one could evidently never be re-
duced to practice, and if it could, involved equal calamities to the innocent 
& the guilty, the necessity of a military force both obnoxious & dangerous, 
and in general a scene resembling much more a civil war than the admin-
istration of a regular Government. 
  Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which instead 
of operating, on the States, should operate without their intervention on 
the individuals composing them; and hence the change in the principle 
and proportion of representation.187 
Madison’s thinking had fundamentally changed over the course of 
the Convention.  He arrived in Philadelphia favoring legislative power 
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 183 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
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over states and the introduction of coercive power to ensure their 
compliance with federal commands.  He left the Convention in favor 
of a central government with legislative power over individuals rather 
than states, and opposed to coercive power over states.  In the end, he 
regarded the Constitution’s novel approach as the only viable plan of 
government.  Prominent Federalists in the state ratifying conventions 
shared his view.  They defended the Constitution’s novel approach, 
and denounced as dangerous and unworkable any plan that would in-
troduce coercive force against states.188 
C.  The Ratification Debates 
A threshold issue during ratification was whether the Articles of 
Confederation could be salvaged or whether an entirely new system 
was needed.  Some Antifederalists argued that the Articles could be 
repaired and that a new Constitution was unnecessary.  Federalists 
generally responded by arguing that the Articles could not be retained 
without authorizing coercive force against states, and that this ap-
proach would lead to civil war.  The Constitution, they explained, au-
thorized Congress to impose obligations on individuals rather than 
states, and therefore relied solely on enforcement against individuals.  
Antifederalists had no response and eventually accepted the need to 
abandon the Articles; however, because the Constitution conferred leg-
islative power over individuals, they now demanded a Bill of Rights.  
The important point for our purposes is that both Federalists and An-
tifederalists understood the choice between amending the Articles and 
adopting the Constitution to be a choice between legislative power 
over states (enforced against states) and legislative power over indi-
viduals (enforced against individuals).  Like the delegates at Philadel-
phia before them, the ratifiers came to regard the Constitution as the 
only viable option. 
Just three weeks after the Constitutional Convention, Alexander 
Hamilton began writing the Federalist Papers.189  Hamilton enlisted 
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John Jay and James Madison to write under the collective name “Pub-
lius.”190  Two of these early essays built on Hamilton’s arguments at 
the Constitutional Convention, and are important for understanding 
the Eleventh Amendment. 
In The Federalist No. 15, first published on December 1, 1787, 
Hamilton examined “the insufficiency of the present Confederation to 
the preservation of the Union.”191  Responding to those who favored 
retaining the Confederation, he argued that there were “fundamental 
errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended oth-
erwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of 
the fabric.”192  According to Hamilton: 
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confedera-
tion is in the principle of legislation for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in 
their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistin-
guished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist. . . . Except as to the 
rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to 
make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise 
either by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America.  The 
consequence of this is that though in theory their resolutions concerning 
those objects are laws constitutionally binding on the members of the  
Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations which the States 
observe or disregard at their option.193 
Hamilton explained that this type of compact is “subject to the usual 
vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and nonobservance, as the 
interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate.”194  He stressed 
that if the United States wished to avoid this “perilous situation,” then 
“we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citi-
zens — the only proper objects of government.”195 
Hamilton maintained that a shift from legislation for states (under 
the Articles) to legislation for individuals (under the Constitution) was 
necessary in order to enforce federal law and avoid civil war.  As he 
explained, “the idea of a law” requires that there be “a penalty or pun-
ishment for disobedience.”196  This penalty “can only be inflicted in 
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two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by 
military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the 
COERCION of arms.”197  “The first kind,” Hamilton explained, “can 
evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity be em-
ployed against bodies politic, or communities, or States.”198  Thus, in a 
confederation (exercising legislative power over its constituent states), 
“every breach of the laws must involve a state of war.”199 
In The Federalist No. 16, published on December 4, 1787, Hamil-
ton posed a stark choice between retaining the Articles of Confedera-
tion (and introducing coercive force against states) or adopting a new 
Constitution (and avoiding coercive force).  In his view, coercive force 
against states was impracticable and likely to cause the “violent death 
of the Confederacy.”200  On the first point, he observed: 
Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these States 
singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they will become 
even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and vi-
sionary any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws to 
operate upon them in their collective capacities and to be executed by a 
coercion applicable to them in the same capacities.201 
Even if coercive force were practicable, Hamilton thought it was too 
dangerous to confer: “When the sword is once drawn, the passions of 
men observe no bounds of moderation. . . . The first war of this kind 
would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.”202 
To avoid these difficulties, Hamilton thought that the federal gov-
ernment “must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, 
upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the 
proposed Constitution.  It must carry the agency to the persons of the 
citizens.”203  By imposing obligations on individuals rather than states, 
the federal government could “employ the arm of the ordinary  
magistrate to execute its own resolutions.”204  In other words, regulat-
ing individuals and enforcing such regulations through “the courts of 
justice”205 would avoid the need either to rely on the “exceptionable 
principle” of “legislation for States”206 or to enforce such legislation  
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by military coercion.  In Hamilton’s view, these considerations  
prevented revision of the Articles and necessitated adoption of the 
Constitution.207 
Hamilton’s arguments against the Articles of Confederation and in 
favor of the Constitution were repeated in state ratifying conventions, 
usually by Federalists who — like Hamilton — had attended the Con-
stitutional Convention.  For example, in Connecticut, William Samuel 
Johnson explained why the Convention abandoned the Articles in fa-
vor of an entirely new system: 
The Convention saw this imperfection in attempting to legislate for states 
in their political capacity; that the coercion of law can be exercised by 
nothing but a military force.  They have therefore gone upon entirely new 
ground.  They have formed one new nation out of the individual states.  
The Constitution vests in the general legislature a power to make laws in 
matters of national concern, to appoint judges to decide upon these laws, 
and to appoint officers to carry them into execution.  This excludes the 
idea of an armed force.  The power which is to enforce these laws is to be 
a legal power vested in proper magistrates.  The force which is to be em-
ployed is the energy of law; and this force is to operate only upon individ-
uals who fail in their duty to their country.208 
In response to renewed Antifederalist objections, Oliver Ellsworth 
reiterated the necessity of enforcing congressional commands against 
individuals rather than states: 
Hence we see, how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle.  No 
man pretends the contrary.  We all see and feel this necessity.  The only 
question is, shall it be a coercion of law or a coercion of arms?  There is 
no other possible alternative.  Where will those who oppose a coercion of 
law come out?  Where will they end?  A necessary consequence of their 
principles is a war of the states, one against the other.  I am for coercion 
by law, that coercion which acts only upon delinquent individuals.  This 
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2010] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1857 
Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states in their 
political capacity.  No coercion is applicable to such bodies, but that of an 
armed force.  If we should attempt to execute the laws of the Union by 
sending an armed force against a delinquent state, it would involve the 
good and bad, the innocent and guilty, in the same calamity.209 
Members of the Massachusetts ratifying convention also stressed 
the Constitution’s grant of legislative power over individuals rather 
than states as its primary advantage over the Articles.210  Rufus King 
explained that “[l]aws to be effective . . . must not be laid on states, but 
upon individuals.”211  Similarly, Samuel Stillman observed that the 
“absolute deficiency of the articles of Confederation, is allowed by 
all.”212  In support, he quoted Randolph’s public assessment that “the 
powers, by which alone the blessings of a general government can be 
accomplished, cannot be interwoven in the Confederation, without a 
change of its very essence; or in other words, that that Confederation 
must be thrown aside.”213 
During the debate in the South Carolina House of Representatives 
over whether to call a ratifying convention, Charles Pinckney — who 
had attended the Constitutional Convention — explained “that the 
states [at the Convention] were unanimous in preferring a change” 
from the Articles of Confederation.214  The reason for this preference 
was that the delegates understood that the Confederation was “nothing 
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more than a federal Union . . . where the members might, or might 
not, comply with their federal engagements, as they thought proper.”215  
According to Pinckney, “the necessity of having a government which 
should at once operate upon the people, and not upon the states, was 
conceived to be indispensible by every delegation present.”216 
At the Virginia ratifying convention, Francis Corbin recounted the 
defects of the Articles of Confederation, especially the inability to raise 
money, and saw only two alternatives: either adopt the Constitution 
and permit direct taxation of individuals or amend the Articles of Con-
federation and vest Congress with a superintending coercive power 
over the states.  Referring to coercive force, Corbin said: 
Is this cruel mode of compulsion eligible?  Is it consistent with the spirit of 
republicanism?  This savage mode, which could be made use of under the 
confederation, leads directly to civil war and destruction.  How different is 
this from the genius of the proposed Constitution?  By this proposed plan, 
the public money is to be collected by mild and gentle means; by a peace-
able and friendly application to the individuals of the community.  
Whereas by the other scheme, the public treasury must be supplied 
through the medium of the sword — by desolation and murder — by the 
blood of the citizens.217 
In his view, amending the Articles was not an option.218  Edmund 
Randolph agreed.  “If an army be . . . once marched into Virginia,” he 
asserted, “[t]he most lamentable civil war must ensue.”219 
James Madison also spoke in the Virginia convention against coer-
cive power over states.  In place of requisitions, he favored giving “the 
General Government, the power of laying and collecting taxes.”220  He 
characterized this power as “indispensible and essential to the exis-
tence of any efficient, or well organized system of Government.”221  
John Marshall agreed.  “By direct taxation, the necessities of the Gov-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 256.  The South Carolina House called a ratifying convention, which met on May 12, 
1788, and ratified the Constitution on May 23, 1788. 
 217 Francis Corbin, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 7, 1788), in 9 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1007, 1009 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) [hereinafter 9 DHRC].   
 218 Id. at 1010 (“Our state-vessel has sprung a-leak — We must embark in a new bottom, or 
sink into perdition.”). 
 219 Id. at 1018.  Antifederalist George Mason stated that the “power of laying direct taxes, does 
of itself, entirely change the confederation of the States into one consolidated Government.”  
George Mason, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 4, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra 
note 217, at 936, 936.  Patrick Henry stated that if the Constitution had used the phrase “we the 
States” rather than the phrase, “We, the people,” then “this would be a confederation: It is other-
wise most clearly a consolidated government.”  Patrick Henry, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention (June 5, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 217, at 951, 951. 
 220 James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 7, 1788), in 9 DHRC, 
supra note 217, at 1028, 1028. 
 221 Id. 
2010] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1859 
ernment will be supplied in a peaceable manner without irritating the 
minds of the people.”222  Requisitions, he said, “cannot be rendered ef-
ficient without a civil war.”223 
In the New York ratifying convention, Robert Livingston opened 
the debate by pointing out that, under the Articles, congressional 
commands were directed only to states and could not be enforced ex-
cept by military force.  He “deduced from [such] observations that the 
old confederation was defective in its principle, and impeachable in its 
execution, as it operated upon States in their political capacity, and  
not upon individuals; and that it carried with it the seeds of  
domestic violence, and tended ultimately to its own dissolution.”224  He 
concluded that “we were driven to the necessity of creating a new  
constitution.”225 
After Antifederalist Melancton Smith warned against adopting a 
new form of government,226 Alexander Hamilton lamented “that there 
is still some lurking favorite imagination, that this system, with correc-
tions, might become a safe and permanent one.”227  Hamilton stressed 
that “the radical vice in the old confederation is, that the laws of the 
Union apply only to States in their corporate capacity.”228  He re-
minded the convention how ineffective requisitions had been in 1780 
when New York was “weak, distressed and forlorn” from “the ravages 
of war.”229  Hamilton argued that there was no effective way to reme-
dy the want of vigor in the Confederation: 
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If you make requisitions and they are not complied with, what is to be 
done?  It has been well observed, that to coerce the States is one of the 
maddest projects that was ever devised.  A failure of compliance will 
never be confined to a single State: This being the case, can we suppose it 
wise to hazard a civil war? . . .  Every such war must involve the innocent 
with the guilty — This single consideration should be sufficient to dispose 
every peaceable citizen against such a government. 
What, Sir, is the cure for this great evil?  Nothing, but to enable the na-
tional laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as those of the 
states do.230 
Hamilton concluded that these considerations foreclosed taking “the 
Old Confederation, as the basis of a new system.”231  Instead, “a gov-
ernment totally different must be instituted,” and we “must totally 
eradicate and discard [the fundamental principle of the Old Confed-
eration] before we can expect an efficient government.”232 
The next day, Smith responded by conceding Hamilton’s point and 
then shifting ground: 
He has taken up much time by endeavouring to prove that the great de-
fect in the old confederation was, that it operated upon states instead of 
individuals.  It is needless to dispute concerning points on which we do 
not disagree: It is admitted that the powers of the general government 
ought to operate upon individuals to a certain degree.  How far the pow-
ers should extend, and in what cases to individuals is the question.233 
By the time North Carolina considered the Constitution, there was 
apparent consensus that the Confederation was defective beyond re-
pair.  William Davie, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention, began by defending the Convention’s decision to abandon 
the Articles: 
Another radical vice in the old system, which was necessary to be cor-
rected, and which will be understood without a long deduction of reason-
ing, was, that it legislated on states, instead of individuals; and that its 
powers could not be executed but by fire or by the sword — by military 
force, and not by the intervention of the civil magistrate. . . .  It was there-
fore absolutely necessary that . . . the laws should be carried home to indi-
viduals themselves.234 
Davie stressed that “[e]very member [of the Convention] saw that the 
existing system would ever be ineffectual, unless its laws operated on 
individuals, as military coercion was neither eligible nor practica-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 230 Id. at 1724–25. 
 231 Id. at 1725. 
 232 Id.  
 233 Melancton Smith, Address to New York Convention (June 21, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra 
note 224, at 1748, 1748. 
 234 William Davie, Address to North Carolina Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 42, at 21–22. 
2010] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1861 
ble.”235  These considerations, he explained, convinced “the Conven-
tion to depart from that solecism in politics — the principle of legisla-
tion for states in their political capacities.”236 
James Iredell — a former delegate to the Constitutional Conven-
tion and a future Supreme Court Justice — stressed the impossibility 
of enforcing requisitions against states: 
Suppose . . . Congress had proceeded to enforce their requisitions, by send-
ing an army to collect them; what would have been the consequence?  
Civil war, in which the innocent must have suffered with the guilty.  
Those who were willing to pay would have been equally distressed with 
those who were unwilling.  Requisitions thus having failed of their pur-
pose, it is proposed, by this Constitution, that, instead of collecting taxes 
by the sword, application shall be made by the government to the individ-
ual citizens.  If any individual disobeys, the courts of justice can give im-
mediate relief.  This is the only natural and effective method of enforcing 
laws.237 
These arguments ultimately persuaded Antifederalists to embrace the 
idea that “the government was not to operate against states, but 
against individuals.”238 
This recognition led some Antifederalists to shift ground and stress 
the need for a Bill of Rights.239  For example, Samuel Spencer high-
lighted the fact that the government was proposed for individuals: 
The very caption of the Constitution shows that this is the case.  The ex-
pression, “We, the people of the United States,” shows that this govern-
ment is intended for individuals; there ought, therefore, to be a bill of 
rights.  I am ready to acknowledge that the Congress ought to have the 
power of executing its laws.  Heretofore, because all the laws of the Con-
federation were binding on the states in their political capacities, courts 
had nothing to do with them; but now the thing is entirely different.  The 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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laws of Congress will be binding on individuals, and those things which 
concern individuals will be brought properly before the courts.240 
Antifederalists and Federalists now agreed that this shift in the nature 
of the Union was necessary because “laws could not be put in execu-
tion against states without the agency of the sword, which, instead of 
answering the ends of government, would destroy it.”241 
D.  Article III and State Suability 
Once Antifederalists agreed that the Articles of Confederation were 
flawed beyond repair, they began to scrutinize the new plan.  They 
identified two provisions that seemed to undercut the Federalists’ case 
for the Constitution.  Article III expressly extended the judicial power 
to controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State” and 
“between a State . . . and foreign . . . Citizens or Subjects.”242  These 
provisions, of course, have been central in the debates about the Elev-
enth Amendment and state sovereign immunity, but are properly un-
derstood as part of the broader debate over the nature of the Union.  
Although the Constitutional Convention approved these provisions 
without debate, Antifederalists became concerned that courts would 
construe them as express authorization for individuals to sue states in 
federal court.  This construction would suggest that the federal gov-
ernment had implied power to coerce states to comply with any result-
ing judgments. 
Prominent Federalists — such as Alexander Hamilton, James Mad-
ison, and John Marshall — responded that Article III should not be 
construed to authorize suits against states.  Rather, they maintained 
that it should be construed narrowly to extend only to suits in which a 
state was the plaintiff.  Modern commentators tend to view these 
comments as puzzling or even disingenuous.  In fact, this reading of 
Article III — whatever its intrinsic merit — necessarily followed from 
the Federalists’ understanding that the proposed Constitution did not 
empower the federal government to coerce state compliance with fed-
eral commands.  From their perspective, any attempt to coerce state 
compliance with judicial decrees under the Constitution would have 
been just as likely to provoke a civil war as an attempt to coerce state 
compliance with congressional requisitions under the Articles of Con-
federation.  Thus, Federalists argued quite sincerely that Article III 
should not be construed to bring about “such a consequence.”243 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 240 Id. at 153; see also id. at 163 (arguing that because the Constitution would act on individu-
als, “the rights of individuals ought to be properly secured”). 
 241 Id. at 163. 
 242 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.   
 243 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 488. 
2010] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1863 
It is also worth noting that Antifederalists raised no similar objec-
tions to Article III’s federal question jurisdiction.  Unlike the state-
citizen diversity provisions, this portion of Article III made no express 
reference to suits against states.  In addition, suits by individuals 
against states were not necessary to enforce the proposed Constitution, 
especially since the Founders did not understand the document to con-
fer either legislative or coercive power over states.  Although it is diffi-
cult to draw firm conclusions from silence, there are several indications 
that neither Federalists nor Antifederalists understood federal question 
jurisdiction to authorize individuals to sue states in federal court.  
During the ratification debates, two individuals mistakenly suggested 
that Article III would permit suits against states by their own citizens.  
When these suggestions were challenged, no one raised federal ques-
tion jurisdiction — or any other provision of Article III — as a basis 
for such suits.  Rather, those who considered the question concluded 
that “[t]here is no expression in the proposed plan to warrant this con-
struction.”244  The state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III drew 
the attention of both Antifederalists and Federalists because they were 
the only provisions that the Founders thought might be construed as 
expressly authorizing individuals to sue states. 
1.  State-Citizen Diversity Jurisdiction. — Some background is  
necessary to understand the problem posed by the state-citizen diversi-
ty provisions of Article III.  The original thirteen states were deeply in 
debt when they met in 1787 to draft a new Constitution.  To fund the 
Revolutionary War, they had borrowed over $200 million.245  Much of 
this debt was no longer in the hands of the original purchasers, having 
been sold at steep discounts to out-of-state speculators.246  Honoring 
this debt would have imposed enormous burdens on state taxpayers 
and threatened some states with financial ruin.  Prior to the Constitu-
tion’s adoption, states were immune from suit without their consent 
and thus free to repay their debts in whatever manner they saw fit.247  
Article III raised concerns during ratification because it arguably au-
thorized out-of-state creditors to sue states in federal court. 
Soon after the Constitution was proposed, the Federal Farmer ob-
jected to the state-citizen clauses of Article III: 
How far it may be proper to admit a foreigner or the citizen of another 
state to bring actions against state governments, which have failed in per-
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forming so many promises made during the war, is doubtful: How far it 
may be proper so to humble a state, as to bring it to answer to an individ-
ual in a court of law, is worthy of consideration; the states are now subject 
to no such actions, and this new jurisdiction will subject the states, and 
many defendants to actions, and processes, which were not in the contem-
plation of the parties, when the contract was made; all engagements exist-
ing between . . . states and citizens of other states were made the parties 
contemplating the remedies then existing on the laws of the states — and 
the new remedy proposed to be given in the federal courts, can be founded 
on no principle whatever.248 
In Article III, Antifederalists had found an issue of concern to the citi-
zens of every state.  If out-of-state creditors could sue states to recover 
their debts, taxpayers would have to pay enormous sums, often to out-
of-state speculators.  In addition, enforcement of any resulting judg-
ments would require the federal government to use coercive force 
against states. 
Brutus objected to the state-citizen provisions of Article III in just 
these terms.  He thought that such jurisdiction was “improper in itself, 
and will, in its exercise, prove most pernicious and destructive.  It is 
improper, because it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the 
suit of an individual.  This is humiliating and degrading to a govern-
ment . . . .”249  Brutus also thought that federal enforcement of judg-
ments against states would be “pernicious and destructive.”  All out-
standing debts, he argued, could eventually be recovered under Article 
III.  Once a state is sued by a citizen of a different state, “the notes of 
the state will pass rapidly from the hands of citizens of the state to 
those of other states,”  meaning that “judgments and executions may 
be obtained against the state for the whole amount of the state 
debt.”250 
Brutus anticipated two important Federalist responses: first, that 
the state-citizen provisions of Article III do not clearly authorize suits 
against states by individuals; and second, that any judgments rendered 
would be impossible to enforce.  On the first point, Brutus stated that 
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if the judicial power “does not extend to these cases, I confess myself 
utterly at a loss to give it any meaning.”251  On the second point, he 
argued that if jurisdiction is proper, then Congress will be able to 
“provide for levying an execution on a state” pursuant to its necessary 
and proper power.252  Thus, “[e]xecution may be levied on any proper-
ty of the state, either real or personal.”253  He even raised the possibili-
ty that “the estate of any individual citizen may . . . be made answer-
able for the discharge of judgments against the state.”254  He 
concluded that the judicial power, if not altered, “will crush the states 
beneath its weight.”255 
These objections moved Alexander Hamilton to respond in The 
Federalist No. 81.256  He observed that it “has been suggested that an 
assignment of the public securities of one State to the citizens of 
another would enable them to prosecute that State in the federal 
courts for the amount of those securities.”257  In his view, this sugges-
tion had “excited some alarm upon very mistaken grounds,” and was 
“without foundation.”258  In Hamilton’s view, Article III did not un-
ambiguously authorize individuals to sue states or empower the federal 
government to enforce any resulting judgments against states: 
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of 
an individual without its consent.  This is the general sense and the gener-
al practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sov-
ereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union.  
Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the 
convention, it will remain with the States and the danger intimated must 
be merely ideal. . . . A recurrence to the principles [governing alienation of 
state sovereignty] will satisfy us that there is no color to pretend that the 
State governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the 
privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every con-
straint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith.  The con-
tracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience 
of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.  They 
confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will.259 
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For Hamilton, background notions of sovereign immunity meant that 
only an express surrender of such immunity would suffice to subject 
states to suits by individuals.  The Constitution not only lacked such 
an express surrender, but it also failed to grant express federal power 
to enforce any resulting judgments against states: 
To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts 
they owe?  How could recoveries be enforced?  It is evident that it could 
not be done without waging war against the contracting State; and to as-
cribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a 
pre-existing right of the State governments, a power which would involve 
such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.260 
Hamilton’s rejection of both state suability and implied enforcement 
power was fully consistent with — if not compelled by — his earlier 
assurances in The Federalist Nos. 15 and 16 that the Constitution did 
not give the federal government power to enact legislation for states or 
coerce them in their collective capacities.261 
The debate over Article III was not confined to New York.262  In 
Massachusetts, Antifederalists expressed fears that Article III autho-
rized out-of-state citizens to sue states in federal court, but were again 
assured by Federalists that this construction was wrong.  After Chis-
holm was decided, Antifederalists reminded the public of these assur-
ances.  Writing in 1793, Marcus recounted that the power of the feder-
al government “to call into their Courts, a Commonwealth or a State, 
to answer to the demand of a foreigner (perhaps a tory) was powerfully 
opposed in the Convention of this and other . . . States.”263  According 
to Marcus, “[t]his power in the Federal Government, would not have 
been consented to by this commonwealth, but for Rufus King[,] Esq. 
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who ‘pledged his honour,’ in the State Convention, ‘that the Conven-
tion at Philadelphia never discovered a disposition to infringe on the 
Government of an individual State.”264  Marcus reported that “[o]n the 
strength of this gentleman’s opinion, the Article in the Constitution 
was assented to but by a small majority.”265 
William Martin, speaking in the Massachusetts House of Repre-
sentatives, also recalled such assurances: 
He observed it was agreed on most sides of the House, that if the article 
did convey the meaning as determined by part of the Judiciary, it was not 
the intention of the [Massachusetts] Convention, nor was it understood to 
be so construed — nay, there were several gentlemen then present, who 
signified their remembrance, that Mr. Sedgwick and Mr. Strong, both in 
Convention, and now in the Senate and House of the United States, had 
declared their minds to that purpose, and that they disapproved of it, and 
would endeavour to bring on the question, and get it altered if possible.266 
Given these assurances, it is not surprising that Sedgwick and Strong 
took the lead in Congress to secure adoption of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.267 
Antifederalists in Virginia raised the same concerns about Article 
III as Antifederalists in New York and Massachusetts, and they were 
likewise reassured by leading Federalists that the provisions would be 
construed narrowly.  For example, Antifederalist George Mason ob-
jected to the state-citizen diversity provisions, and asked how judg-
ments in such cases could be enforced: 
Is this State to be brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent individu-
al? — Is the sovereignty of the State to be arraigned like a culprit, or pri-
vate offender? — Will the States undergo this mortification?  I think this 
power perfectly unnecessary.  But let us pursue this subject further.  What 
is to be done if a judgment be obtained against a State? — Will you issue 
a fieri facias?  It would be ludicrous to say, that you could put the State’s 
body in jail.  How is the judgment then to be inforced?  A power which 
cannot be executed, ought not to be granted.268 
James Madison responded to Mason’s objections by candidly acknowl-
edging “that this part [of the Constitution] does not stand in that form, 
which would be freest from objection.  It might be better ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. at 389–90.  Referring to Rufus King’s remarks at the state ratifying convention, a Demo-
crat likewise recalled: “A great civilian rose; and, in an harangue, of two hours length, endeav-
oured to prove that, the article in debate, could not possibly bear the construction put upon it by 
gentlemen.”  Democrat, MASS. MERCURY, July 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 
393, 393. 
 266 Account of William Martin’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 
INDEP. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1793, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 434, 434. 
 267 See infra notes 439–448 and accompanying text. 
 268 George Mason, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 
185, at 1403, 1406 (footnote omitted). 
1868 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1817 
pressed.”269  He insisted, however, that “a fair and liberal interpreta-
tion upon the words” would not authorize the general government “to 
commit the oppressions [Mason] dreads.”270 
The next day, Madison tried to defuse the objections by construing 
Article III to permit suits by — but not against — states: 
Its jurisdiction in controversies between a State and citizens of another 
State, is much objected to, and perhaps without reason.  It is not in the 
power of individuals to call any State into Court.  The only operation it 
can have, is, that if a State should wish to bring suit against a citizen, it 
must be brought before the Federal Court. . . . It is a case which cannot 
often happen, and if it should be found improper, it will be altered.271 
This response did not satisfy Antifederalists like Patrick Henry who 
decried the prospect of “incarcerating a State.”272  Henry said that it 
would ease his mind “if the Honorable Gentleman would tell me the 
manner in which money should be paid, if in a suit between a State 
and individuals, the State were cast.”273  Referring to Madison’s earlier 
stance against giving Congress coercive power over states, Henry 
mockingly remarked that “[t]he Honorable Gentleman perhaps does 
not mean to use coercion, but some gentle caution.”274  He next criti-
cized Madison’s narrow reading of the text to mean “that the State 
may be the plaintiff only.”275  Henry said that this construction was 
“perfectly incomprehensible,”276 and objected that “[i]f Gentlemen per-
vert the most clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language 
of the people, there is an end of all argument.”277 
John Marshall answered Henry by construing Article III narrowly 
in light of background principles of sovereign immunity: 
With respect to disputes between a State, and the citizens of another State, 
its jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence.  I hope no Gen-
tlemen will think that a State will be called at the bar of the Federal 
Court.  Is there no such case at present?  Are there not many cases in 
which the Legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the State is not sued?  
It is not rational to suppose, that the sovereign power shall be dragged be-
fore a Court.  The intent is, to enable States to recover claims of individu-
als residing in other States.  I contend this construction is warranted by 
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the words.  But, they say, there will be partiality in it if a State cannot be 
defendant — if an individual cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a 
State, though he may be sued by a State.  It is necessary to be so, and 
cannot be avoided.  I see a difficulty in making a State defendant, which 
does not prevent its being plaintiff.278 
Madison’s and Marshall’s narrow construction of Article III was con-
sistent with their general understanding that the Constitution gave the 
federal government neither legislative nor coercive power over 
states.279  In essence, they agreed with Hamilton that reading  
Article III broadly to authorize suits against states — and therefore 
imply coercive power over states — “would be altogether forced and 
unwarrantable.”280 
Modern commentators sometimes suggest that Federalists like 
Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall were either “disingenuous” or “dis-
sembling” when they argued that Article III should not be construed to 
permit individuals to sue states because these men otherwise favored 
enhanced federal powers.281  Whatever one thinks of their construc-
tion, their position on state suability is not surprising given their un-
derstanding that the Constitution did not authorize the use of coercive 
force against states.  All three thought that the use of such power 
would provoke a civil war, and that the lack of such power in the 
Constitution was one of its crucial advantages over proposals to 
amend the Articles of Confederation.  On the central issues of taxation, 
raising armies, and regulating commerce, the Constitution solved pre-
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viously intractable enforcement problems by authorizing Congress to 
legislate for individuals rather than states.  The Antifederalists’ sug-
gestion that the state-citizen provisions of Article III empowered fed-
eral courts to hear suits against states reintroduced the specter of coer-
cive power, and thus threatened to undermine a key reason for 
adopting the Constitution.  From this perspective, Hamilton, Madison, 
and Marshall had genuine and compelling reasons for construing these 
provisions narrowly. 
2.  Federal Question Jurisdiction. — One might wonder why Anti-
federalists did not also object to federal question jurisdiction under Ar-
ticle III on the ground that it could be construed to permit suits 
against states by individuals.  If — as modern theories of the Eleventh 
Amendment assume — federal question jurisdiction authorizes federal 
courts to hear suits by citizens against their own states, then one would 
have expected Antifederalists at least to have questioned the propriety 
of such jurisdiction.  In the debates over state-citizen diversity juris-
diction, the Founders generally seem to have assumed that the states 
would retain their preexisting immunity unless they expressly surren-
dered it in the Constitution.282  The fight over the state-citizen provi-
sions of Article III centered on whether they should be construed as an 
express surrender.  Federalists insisted that an ambiguous surrender 
(merely extending judicial power to controversies “between” states and 
out-of-state citizens) would not suffice.  Antifederalists, on the other 
hand, feared (correctly) that judges would construe the relevant lan-
guage as an express surrender.  Unlike the state-citizen diversity provi-
sions, however, federal question jurisdiction contains no reference — 
clear or ambiguous — to suits against states.  Perhaps for this reason, 
there was no real debate during the ratification era over whether fed-
eral question jurisdiction could be construed as a surrender of state 
sovereign immunity. 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the Founders would not 
have regarded suits against states as a necessary means of enforcing 
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.  There was a 
long tradition among English and early American courts of permitting 
aggrieved individuals to sue government officers in tort.283  Officers 
could shield themselves from liability by showing that their conduct 
was authorized by law, but were left defenseless if the law they in-
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voked was unconstitutional.284  The Founders may have expected, 
therefore, that the Constitution’s original prohibitions on states would 
be enforced in suits between individuals or in cases brought by the 
state.285  In addition, Federalists and Antifederalists generally agreed 
that the Constitution did not give Congress either legislative or coer-
cive power over states.  Given these background assumptions, it is not 
surprising that Antifederalists did not perceive federal question juris-
diction as a potential waiver of state sovereign immunity.  The only 
provisions that plausibly could have been read as an express authori-
zation to hear suits by individuals against states were the state-citizen 
diversity provisions of Article III. 
Indeed, the only direct evidence relating to federal question juris-
diction undermines the modern assumption that the Founders must 
have understood such jurisdiction to permit in-state citizens to be able 
to sue their own states.  That evidence arose from two inadvertent 
mistakes.  Writing as “Aristides,” Alexander Contee Hanson — a Fed-
eralist delegate to the Maryland ratifying convention — published a 
pamphlet on January 31, 1788 defending the proposed Constitution.  
In describing the judicial power, Hanson stated that the original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court extends to “Cases between a state, and 
its own citizens.”286  Tench Coxe, a prominent Pennsylvania Federal-
ist,287 informed Hanson that the pamphlet mistakenly described the 
judicial power as extending to cases between a state and its own citi-
zens.  Hanson immediately acknowledged his mistake and explained 
the actions he had taken to correct it: 
You are quite right with respect to my misconception of the judiciary; and 
how I came to blunder so very grossly, after bestowing great attention, to 
that article more particularly, I am entirely at a loss to account.  I thank 
you for your hints.  I examined the pamphlet with the constitution imme-
diately after I read your letter.  I have already sent Goddard my apology, 
which you will perhaps see in his paper.  The mistake being favorable to 
the antifederalists they did not think proper to expose it, altho[ugh] they 
asserted generally, that I was entirely mistaken . . . .288 
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 On April 1, 1788, Hanson’s letter “To the People of Maryland” ap-
peared in William Goddard’s Maryland Journal.289  In pertinent part, 
Hanson’s letter states: 
 On a review of my late Pamphlet, I perceive that I have erred with respect 
to the federal judiciary.  I have stated, that the original jurisdiction of the 
federal court extends to cases between a state and its own citizens. — 
There is no expression in the proposed plan to warrant this construction; 
and I am at a loss to account for the mistake, which is pointed out in a 
private letter, I have just received from Philadelphia. 
As my exposition may probably have communicated the error to others, it 
was my duty to make this public acknowledgment.  I am happy that the 
mistake cannot be supposed willful — My purpose was to defend the con-
stitution; but to increase the jurisdiction of the federal courts, could have 
no other tendency than to increase the number of its enemies.290 
Hanson’s and Coxe’s statements indicate that they did not believe that 
there was any “expression in the proposed plan to warrant” the conclu-
sion that the judicial power extended to cases between a state and its 
own citizens.  We know that Hanson considered federal question juris-
diction because he describes it in his original pamphlet, and he “exam-
ined the pamphlet with the constitution immediately after” receiving 
Coxe’s letter.  Although modern theorists assume that federal question 
jurisdiction encompasses suits by citizens against their own states, 
Coxe and Hanson apparently thought that only an express authoriza-
tion to hear suits against states could suffice to confer such jurisdic-
tion.  Moreover, Antifederalists did not challenge Hanson’s correction 
or suggest that federal question jurisdiction would support suits by in-
dividuals against states, even though it would have provided them 
with additional ammunition against the proposed Constitution. 
A few months later, George Mason, a leading Antifederalist, made 
a similar mistake at the Virginia ratifying convention.  After objecting 
to the various grants of diversity jurisdiction set forth in Article III, 
Mason stated: “The last clause is still more improper.  To give [federal 
courts] cognizance in disputes between a State and the citizens thereof, 
is utterly inconsistent with reason or good policy.”291  George Nicholas 
interrupted Mason to inform him “that his interpretation of this part 
was not warranted by the words.”292  Mason replied that his descrip-
tion was based on his recollection, but acknowledged “that as his 
memory had never been good, and was now much impaired from his 
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age, he would not insist on that interpretation.”293  No one invoked 
federal question jurisdiction in support of Mason’s description. 
Although these incidents involve statements by only four Founders, 
their remarks are consistent with the broader understanding of the na-
ture of the Union under the proposed Constitution.  Coxe, Hanson, 
Mason, and Nicholas were sophisticated participants in the drafting 
and ratification of the Constitution.  As these incidents reveal, none of 
these individuals understood the judicial power to reach suits between 
states and their own citizens.  Antifederalists were not shy about high-
lighting provisions of the Constitution to which they objected and had 
every incentive to exploit Hanson’s and Mason’s mistakes if they had 
represented a plausible construction of Article III.294 
3.  Suits Between a State and Another State or a Foreign State. — 
During ratification, Antifederalists objected most strenuously to fed-
eral jurisdiction over suits against states by individuals.  There was no 
corresponding alarm regarding suits between two or more states, or 
suits between a state and a foreign state.  Article III expressly autho-
rizes suits between (and therefore against) states.  By ratifying the 
Constitution, states essentially agreed to such jurisdiction as a kind of 
binding arbitration.  Although judgments in such cases might be hard 
to enforce, establishing a means of resolving such disputes arguably 
furthered — rather than threatened — national peace and harmony.  If 
a defendant state refused to comply with a federal judgment, then the 
preexisting dispute would continue and the parties would be no worse 
off.  By contrast, if a defendant state complied with the judgment, 
then the states’ decision to submit to such jurisdiction would have suc-
ceeded in defusing the dispute.  In other words, federal jurisdiction 
over suits between states (and perhaps between a state and a foreign 
state) might frequently provide the very means of avoiding a war be-
tween states, whereas federal jurisdiction over suits by individuals 
against states might actually provoke a civil war. 
The Constitution enables states to resolve their differences volun-
tarily by making compacts with the consent of Congress.295  When 
they are unable to do so, the Constitution provides an alternative to 
war by expressly authorizing suits “between two or more States” in the 
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original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.296  The Articles of Confed-
eration employed similar jurisdiction as a way to prevent, rather than 
provoke, war between states.297  When the Constitution was adopted, 
“there were existing controversies between eleven states respecting 
their boundaries, which arose under their respective charters, and had 
continued from the first settlement of the colonies.”298  Prominent 
Founders regarded territorial disputes as likely to create hostility 
among states and established the Supreme Court as an “umpire or 
common judge to interpose between the contending parties.”299  In dis-
cussing this jurisdiction, Madison reiterated that the national govern-
ment “in its ordinary and most essential proceedings” would operate 
“on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual 
capacities,” rather than “on the political bodies composing the Confed-
eracy, in their political capacities.”300  Madison acknowledged that in 
boundary disputes between states “the tribunal which is ultimately to 
decide . . . is to be established under the general government,” but in 
his view, “[s]ome such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal 
to the sword and a dissolution of the compact.”301  In other words, the 
Founders recognized that the underlying dispute between states —  
rather than any federal judgment attempting to resolve it — posed the 
greater risk of sparking hostilities. 
There was no similar consensus regarding jurisdiction over suits 
between a state and a foreign state.302  This jurisdiction is found in the 
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same clause that confers state–foreign citizen diversity jurisdiction, 
and authorizes the federal judiciary to hear suits “between a State . . . 
and foreign States.”303  Some Antifederalists objected to this jurisdic-
tion because it could be construed to give foreign states an asymme-
trical right to sue states without their consent.304  Under the law of na-
tions, a state could not sue a foreign state without its consent, but it 
was unclear whether the same restriction prevented a foreign state 
from suing one of the United States.  Some Federalists opined that the 
jurisdiction would only apply when both parties consented to suit,305 
but some Antifederalists remained unconvinced and read Article III to 
allow foreign states to sue American states without their consent.306  In 
the end, however, the provision generated much less controversy than 
the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III.307 
IV.  THE ADOPTION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
The Eleventh Amendment was drafted to reinstate the narrow con-
struction of Article III promised by Federalists during the ratification 
debates, and to avoid the enforcement problems created by permitting 
individuals to sue states in federal court.  Although prominent Federal-
ists had assured skeptics that the state-citizen diversity provisions of 
Article III would not be construed to permit individuals to sue states, 
the constitutional text was at best ambiguous.  After the Constitution 
was ratified, out-of-state citizens filed suits against six different states 
in the 1790s.  These suits, particularly Chisholm v. Georgia and Vassall 
v. Massachusetts, triggered the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.  
The Amendment eliminated any ambiguity in the state-citizen diversi-
ty provisions by specifying that “[t]he Judicial power of the United 
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States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”308  
Modern commentators believe that this language — applied literally — 
creates an unacceptable anomaly by prohibiting all suits by out-of-
state citizens while leaving in-state citizens free to sue using federal 
question jurisdiction.  Given their widely expressed understanding that 
the Constitution gave the federal government neither legislative nor 
coercive power over states, however, those who drafted and ratified 
the Amendment simply may not have perceived any such anomaly.  
The Founders apparently did not understand federal question jurisdic-
tion to constitute an express authorization for any individual to sue 
any state in federal court.  In addition, the Founders may not have re-
garded such jurisdiction as necessary to enforce federal law.  On these 
assumptions, the Amendment created no anomaly and provided a 
complete solution to the problems created by suits like Chisholm and 
Vassall. 
A.  The Chisholm Decision 
Three cases are central to understanding the Eleventh Amendment: 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia,309 Vassall v. Massachusetts, and Chisholm v. 
Georgia.  Hollingsworth arose out of a dispute between the Indiana 
Company and Virginia over title to 1.8 million acres of land in what 
would become West Virginia.310  The Indiana Company — composed 
of wealthy Pennsylvania and New Jersey merchants and land specula-
tors — obtained a deed to the land from Indian tribes in 1768 as com-
pensation for the earlier theft of property from merchants and traders 
in the Ohio Valley.311  Virginia claimed the same land under its 1609 
charter and two Indian treaties predating the 1768 grant.312  Counsel 
for the Company, including Edmund Randolph, presented the Compa-
ny’s case to the Virginia legislature in 1779, but Virginia refused to 
compromise.313  In 1781, James Wilson — future delegate to the Con-
stitutional Convention and Supreme Court Justice — obtained 300 
shares in the Company.314  Subsequent efforts in Congress to resolve 
the dispute failed.315 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 308 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  
 309 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). 
 310 See 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 274. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. at 277–78. 
 314 Id. at 282 n.50. 
 315 Id. at 279–80. 
2010] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1877 
Notwithstanding their interest in the Indiana Company’s dispute 
with Virginia, Randolph and Wilson went on to play leading roles in 
drafting Article III, establishing state suability in Chisholm, and pro-
voking the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.  Both men were 
members of the Committee of Detail that drafted the ambiguous lan-
guage of Article III at issue in Chisholm, and they may have had cases 
like the Indiana Company’s dispute with Virginia in mind when they 
concluded that the judicial power extended to controversies “between 
a State and Citizens of another State.”316  The Company used this very 
jurisdiction to sue Virginia in 1792.317  While the Virginia legislature 
considered the suit, Governor Henry Lee traveled to Philadelphia to 
attend the arguments in Chisholm v. Georgia.318  He described the case 
as a suit “now pending before the court which involves the principle 
on which rests the constitutional question whether a state can be 
brought into court at the suit of individuals.”319 
Shortly before Chisholm came down, Randolph filed another suit in 
the Supreme Court, this time on behalf of William Vassall against 
Massachusetts.  Vassall had lived in Boston, but fled to London in 
1775 to avoid the Revolutionary War.320  Massachusetts designated 
him as a Loyalist, barred him from returning, seized his personal 
property, and mortgaged his house.  Following the Treaty of Peace of 
1783, Vassall sought the return of his property.321  Article VI of the 
treaty provided that “there shall be no future confiscations 
made . . . against any person or persons for, or by reason of the part 
which he or they may have taken in the present war.”322  After the 
treaty took effect, Massachusetts passed a statute providing that all 
real property mortgaged by the state and all personal property seized 
by the state would be considered confiscated.323  Vassall regarded the 
statute as “a direct contravention of the Definitive Treaty.”324  None-
theless, his efforts to obtain compensation from the state failed.  When 
the Constitution was ratified, he decided to sue Massachusetts.  He in-
formed his counsel that he would argue that his property was confis-
cated in violation of the treaty.325  He retained Edmund Randolph to 
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file suit, and the Supreme Court authorized process to be served just 
one week before it decided Chisholm v. Georgia.  
Chisholm was the first decision to construe Article III to permit an 
individual to sue a state in federal court.326  Edmund Randolph (as an 
advocate) and James Wilson (as a Justice) played key roles in bringing 
about the decision.  The case arose out of a 1777 contract between the 
state of Georgia and Robert Farquhar, of South Carolina, for the pur-
chase of supplies.327  Farquhar delivered the goods, but was never 
paid.328  Alexander Chisholm, also of South Carolina, served as an ex-
ecutor of Farquhar’s estate.329  After the Constitution was ratified, 
Chisholm sued Georgia in the Supreme Court.330 
Attorney General Edmund Randolph, acting as Chisholm’s attor-
ney, moved to compel Georgia to appear.331  The Georgia House of 
Representatives passed a resolution on December 14, 1792, denying 
that Article III of the Constitution gave the Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion to hear the case, and declaring that Georgia would regard any 
judgment as unconstitutional.332  The House also called for the adop-
tion of an “explanatory amendment” to the Constitution to clarify that 
Article III should not be construed to permit individuals to bring ac-
tions against states in federal court.333  The Court heard argument on 
the motion in early February 1793.  Randolph argued unopposed be-
cause Georgia declined to appear.334 
Randolph relied on “the letter of the Constitution” to support his 
position that the “judicial power is extended to controversies between 
a State and citizens of another State.”335  This express provision, he 
said, “in no respect indicat[ed] who is to be Plaintiff or who Defen-
dant.”336  Randolph also argued that “the spirit of the Constitution” 
supported his position because a suit against a state may be the only 
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way for an individual to vindicate his rights.337  He next addressed the 
“master-objection that . . . the law has prescribed no execution against 
a State; that none can be formed with propriety; and that, therefore, a 
judgment against a State must be abortive.”338  Randolph suggested 
that execution may “spring from the will of the Supreme Court” in the 
exercise of its “incidental authority.”339  He acknowledged that devis-
ing a method of execution was “a difficult task,” but suggested three 
possibilities.340  First, “if the judgment be for the specific thing, it may 
be seized.”341  Second, if the judgment is “for damages, such property 
may be taken” as would establish “jurisdiction over a sovereign 
Prince” under the law of nations.342  Finally, the Court could simply 
enter judgment and “leave their opinions to be enforced by the  
Executive.”343 
On February 18, 1793, all five Justices delivered separate opinions.  
Chisholm was arguably the Supreme Court’s first major textualist de-
cision.344  Chief Justice Jay and Justices Wilson, Blair, and Cushing 
relied on the text of Article III to permit suits against a state by citi-
zens of another state.  Justice Iredell, by contrast, construed Article III 
narrowly in light of the Constitution’s failure to grant Congress coer-
cive power over states and its broader purpose to avoid a civil war.  
The Chisholm opinions reveal a fundamental disagreement regarding 
the existence of federal power to coerce states.  Justice Wilson and 
Chief Justice Jay explicitly assumed that jurisdiction to hear suits 
against states implied coercive power to enforce any resulting judg-
ments.345  Justice Iredell, by contrast, reasoned that because the Con-
stitution conferred no federal power to coerce states, Article III should 
not be construed to grant jurisdiction over suits by individuals against 
states.346 
Justice Blair’s opinion stressed that the text of Article III expressly 
extended “to controversies between a State and citizens of another 
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State.”347  He saw no basis for distinguishing between cases in which a 
state is the plaintiff and those in which it is the defendant.  “Both cas-
es,” he thought, “were intended.”348  Accordingly, he concluded “that if 
this Court should refuse to hold jurisdiction of a case where a State is 
Defendant, it would renounce part of the authority conferred, and, 
consequently, part of the duty imposed on it by the Constitution.”349  
With respect to inducing Georgia’s appearance, Justice Blair thought 
the Court should give the state extra time “for more deliberate consid-
eration.”350  If after such consideration the state should refuse to ap-
pear, then he would enter judgment against the state.351 
Justice Wilson framed the question as whether a state “is amenable 
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States,”352 but 
suggested that the question “may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into 
one, no less radical than this — ‘do the people of the United States 
form a Nation?’”353  Justice Wilson began his constitutional analysis 
by observing that, under the Articles of Confederation, the confederacy 
was “totally inadequate” because its legislative authority consisted 
solely of requisitions on states and because it had no executive or judi-
cial power.354  “[T]o form a more perfect Union,” the Constitution 
vested legislative, executive, and judicial power in the new govern-
ment.355  The question, as Justice Wilson saw it, was whether the 
people who ratified the Constitution could “bind those States, and 
Georgia among the others, by the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
power so vested?”356  Justice Wilson thought that “this question must 
unavoidably receive an affirmative answer” because the people of the 
states and “the people of Georgia, in particular, could alter, as they 
pleased, their former work.”357  The only question, therefore, was: 
“Has the Constitution done so?”358 
Before turning to the “direct and explicit declarations” of Article 
III, Justice Wilson addressed “a previous enquiry” from which the 
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question could be resolved “by fair and conclusive deductions.”359  To 
determine the scope of the judicial power, he thought the Court should 
first ask whether the “people intend[ed] to bind those states by the 
Legislative power vested by that Constitution.”360  “The articles of 
confederation,” he pointed out, “did not operate upon individual citi-
zens; but operated only upon States.”361  Some, he observed, “seem to 
think, that the present Constitution operates only on individual citi-
zens, and not on States.”362  He thought this view was “unfounded” 
because Article I, Section 10 declared that “certain laws of the States 
are . . . ‘subject to the revision and controul of the Congress.’”363  
Thus, “it cannot, surely, be contended that the Legislative power of the 
national Government was meant to have no operation on the several 
States.”364  In his view, the fact that the legislative power applies in 
one instance “proves the principle in all other instances, to which the 
facts will be found to apply.”365 
Having found national legislative power over states, Justice Wilson 
examined whether the national executive and judicial powers also 
bound the states.  In finding that they do, he reasoned that “[i]t would 
be superfluous to make laws, unless those laws, when made, were to 
be enforced.”366  In his view, “[n]othing could be more natural than to 
intend that this Legislative power should be enforced by powers Ex-
ecutive and Judicial.”367  He also invoked the Contracts Clause in 
support of state suability: “What good purpose could this Constitution-
al provision secure, if a State might pass a law impairing the obliga-
tion of its own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of 
right, to no controuling judiciary power?”368  Finally, in addition to 
these deductions, Justice Wilson invoked “the direct and explicit decla-
ration of the Constitution itself.”369  He stated that by extending the 
judicial power to “controversies, between a state and citizens of anoth-
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er State,”370 Article III expressly described “the cause now depending 
before the tribunal.”371 
Justice Cushing’s opinion also stressed that the judicial power “is 
expressly extended to ‘controversies between a State and citizens of 
another State,’”372 and that “[t]he case, then, seems clearly to fall with-
in the letter of the Constitution.”373  He refused to construe Article III 
to limit jurisdiction to cases in which a state is the plaintiff, in part be-
cause Article III also confers jurisdiction over controversies between 
two or more states.  In such cases, he observed, one state must be the 
defendant.374  He also rejected the argument that asserting jurisdiction 
over suits by individuals against states would “reduce States to mere 
corporations, and take away all sovereignty.”375  In his view, any ab-
ridgement of state sovereignty by the Constitution “was thought neces-
sary for the greater indispensable good of the whole.”376  Justice Cush-
ing found it unnecessary to decide whether the Court also had 
jurisdiction over suits against the United States, although he suggested 
that he might not find such jurisdiction.377  Finally, he foreshadowed 
the Eleventh Amendment by noting that “[i]f the Constitution is found 
inconvenient in practice in this or any other particular, it is well that a 
regular mode is pointed out for amendment.”378 
Chief Justice Jay upheld the Court’s jurisdiction based on three 
considerations.  First, Chief Justice Jay denied that Georgia was sove-
reign because sovereignty rested with the people, not the states.379  
Second, he maintained that suability was compatible with state sover-
eignty.  He based this conclusion on the fact that “one State in the Un-
ion may sue another State, in this Court.”380  Thus, he thought “it 
plainly follows, that suability and state sovereignty are not incompati-
ble.”381  Third, Jay concluded that “the Constitution (to which Georgia 
is a party) authorises . . . an action against her” by a citizen of another 
state.382  He began by noting that the Preamble to the Constitution 
lists among its objects “[t]o establish justice.”383  Article III furthered 
this goal, he said, by extending the judicial power “to ten descriptions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 370 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 371 Id. 
 372 Id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). 
 373 Id. 
 374 Id. 
 375 Id. at 468. 
 376 Id.  
 377 Id. at 469. 
 378 Id. at 468. 
 379 See id. at 470–72 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 380 Id. at 473. 
 381 Id.  
 382 Id. at 470. 
 383 Id. at 474. 
2010] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 1883 
of cases.”384  One of these categories consists of “controversies between 
a State and citizens of another State.”385  Chief Justice Jay invoked the 
“ordinary rules for construction” to reject the suggestion “that this 
ought to be construed to reach none of these controversies, excepting 
those in which a State may be Plaintiff.”386  He said that the “exten-
sion of power is remedial,” and ought “therefore, to be construed liber-
ally.”387  For all of these reasons, Chief Justice Jay found that Article 
III expressly authorized Chisholm’s suit against Georgia.388 
Unlike the majority opinions, Justice Iredell’s dissent reflects the 
concerns about federal coercion of states that animated the framing 
and ratification of the Constitution.  Justice Iredell began by offering a 
statutory basis for rejecting jurisdiction.  He concluded that the Judi-
ciary Act did not authorize the Court to compel a state to appear be-
fore it.  As support, he stressed the shift from federal power over states 
under the Articles of Confederation to federal power over individuals 
under the Constitution: 
The powers of the general Government, either of a Legislative or Execu-
tive nature, or which particularly concerns Treaties with Foreign Powers, 
do for the most part (if not wholly) affect individuals, and not States: They 
require no aid from any State authority.  This is the great leading distinc-
tion between the old articles of confederation, and the present constitu-
tion.389 
Justice Iredell explained that the judicial power goes beyond the li-
mited nature of federal legislative and executive power because of the 
inclusion in Article III of party-based jurisdiction — jurisdiction over 
disputes beyond the reach of federal legislative authority.390  Assuming 
that Congress had incidental power to implement such jurisdiction, 
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Justice Iredell thought that Congress’s failure to do so was sufficient to 
deny Chisholm’s motion.391 
Because the other Justices had reached the constitutional issue, 
however, Justice Iredell proceeded to discuss whether “upon a fair con-
struction of the Constitution of the United States, the power contended 
for really exists.”392  He was “strongly against any construction of [the 
Constitution], which will admit, under any circumstances, a compul-
sive suit against a State for the recovery of money.”393  Echoing Hamil-
ton’s and Madison’s arguments during the ratification debates, Justice 
Iredell thought that “every word in the Constitution may have its full 
effect without involving this consequence, and that nothing but ex-
press words, or an insurmountable implication (neither of which I con-
sider, can be found in this case) would authorise the deduction of so 
high a power.”394  He ends with a prayer that the Court’s doctrine will 
result in “none of the evils with which, I have the concern to say, it 
appears to me to be pregnant.”395 
In addition to his reported dissent, Justice Iredell prepared a sepa-
rate document, also dated February 18, 1793, containing his observa-
tions on “this great Constitutional Question.”396  The document con-
tains passages similar to those in his published opinion, but also  
elaborates several points.  Because there was no official reporter, it is 
possible that Justice Iredell “may have incorporated [these observa-
tions] in his oral presentation in the Supreme Court.”397  He made two 
important points for our purposes.  First, he reiterated that the Consti-
tution was designed to be enforced against individuals rather than 
states: 
A State doing injury to the Citizens of other States or Foreigners is to be 
sure a supposable case, but it is scarcely supposable, I think, (if at all) but 
by means of some act of the [state] Legislature, (for no inferior authority I 
think can bind a State) . . . .  If the act be consistent with the Const. of the 
particular State, & the U.S., it is binding upon all, and this Court hath no 
means of redressing it.  If it be inconsistent with either, the act is utterly 
void, and can operate as no bar to the Individual right.  This, I take it, is 
the very manner in which the Const. intended all Laws of the U.S. (except 
in the peculiar instance of a Controversy between 2 or more States & per-
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haps one or two other instances) should operate — upon Individuals & not 
States.398 
Second, Justice Iredell stressed that the Constitution confers no 
means of coercing states to comply with judgments in suits brought by 
individuals.  He observed that the Attorney General “seems very much 
at a loss how our Judgment is to be enforced.”399  Justice Iredell then 
suggested that, in the absence of an effective remedy, the Constitution 
should not be construed to give federal courts jurisdiction to hear such 
cases in the first place: 
The observation “that where there is a Right, there is a Remedy”, may be 
reversed — “That where no remedy can be found, there is no right.”  This, 
I will be bold to say, is an invariable Criterion, in respect to all compul-
sory suits, to try whether such a suit can in reality be maintained.400 
Justice Iredell likened a judgment in a case like Chisholm to a recom-
mendation of Congress to the states under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.  In both cases, if the state thought the debt was just, the state 
would pay it.  “If in their opinion unjust, they would not be better dis-
posed to pay, if left to their option, after Judgment on a compulsory 
process.”401  He thought that “this is too much akin to the principle of 
relying on Recommendations, which we well know were for years al-
together inefficacious in the most trying circumstances, to have been 
seriously contemplated in my opinion as an important Improvement 
under the new System.”402  He observed that “it is essential to a Court 
of J[ustice] that if it has power to pronounce a Judgment, it should 
likewise have power to carry it into Execution.”403  Because he be-
lieved that the Constitution did not give Congress power to coerce 
states, he concluded that the ambiguous provisions of Article III 
should not be construed to authorize suits by individuals against 
states. 
Wilson and Jay’s embrace of federal power to coerce states to 
comply with federal commands (including adverse judicial judgments) 
ran counter to the Constitutional Convention’s fundamental decision 
to construct a system that did not confer coercive power over states.404  
During the ratification debates, Federalists repeatedly pointed to this 
feature as one of the Constitution’s primary advantages over proposals 
to revise the Articles of Confederation.405  Indeed, Federalists went so 
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far as to argue that a “Union of States containing such an ingredient 
seemed to provide for its own destruction.”406  Similarly, in defending 
the Constitution, Hamilton dismissed “as idle and visionary any 
scheme which aims at regulating [the states’] movements by laws to 
operate upon them in their collective capacities and to be executed by 
a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities.”407  Justice Iredell 
himself argued at the North Carolina ratifying convention that con-
gressional attempts to enforce requisitions against states would lead to 
a “[c]ivil war.”408  In his view, “the only natural and effective way of 
enforcing laws” was against individuals, not states.409  Based on argu-
ments like these, the Founders were convinced to abandon the Articles 
and adopt a Constitution that conferred neither legislative nor coercive 
power over states. 
In retrospect, it is not entirely surprising that the Chisholm Court 
interpreted Article III to encompass the case.  Georgia did not appear 
and thus Randolph’s arguments went unopposed.  In addition, as An-
tifederalists had repeatedly warned, the text of Article III could readily 
be construed as an express grant of such jurisdiction.410  Even Madi-
son — who assured Antifederalists that Article III would not be con-
strued to allow suits against states — admitted that this part of the 
Constitution might have been “better expressed.”411  Whether the Chis-
holm Court properly construed Article III is an interesting and difficult 
interpretive question, but is largely beside the point.  The agreement 
among Federalists and Antifederalists during the ratification period 
against the propriety of such jurisdiction — and against coercive pow-
er over states more generally — virtually ensured that the Constitution 
would be amended to overturn Chisholm. 
B.  The Aftermath of Chisholm 
The reaction to Chisholm was swift and almost uniformly hostile.  
The anger seemed to be directed as much against Federalists who had 
given assurances regarding Article III during ratification as against the 
Supreme Court itself.  Antifederalists — who had originally urged al-
tering Article III to guard against state suability — felt that Federalists 
had played a game of “bait and switch.”  The Federalists’ assurances 
persuaded at least some Antifederalists to support the Constitution.  
Now, a Court composed of Federalists had construed the state-citizen 
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diversity provisions of Article III to permit individuals to sue states af-
ter all.  It bears emphasizing, however, that Federalists were equally 
disappointed with the Court’s decision because it contradicted their 
earlier assurances and created all of the problems associated with coer-
cive power over states that they had designed the Constitution to 
avoid.  Accordingly, Federalists now joined Antifederalists in support-
ing a constitutional amendment to restore their preferred construction.  
For example, Theodore Sedgwick and Caleb Strong had both assured 
Antifederalists during the Massachusetts Convention that Article III 
would not be construed to permit individuals to sue states, and both 
now led efforts to amend the Constitution. 
Although many assume that Georgia took the lead in amending the 
Constitution, Massachusetts — faced with its own suit — was actually 
the first state to take action.412  Just one day after Chisholm came 
down, Representative Sedgwick of Massachusetts introduced a broadly 
worded constitutional amendment in the United States House of Rep-
resentatives to prohibit federal courts from hearing any and all suits 
against states regardless of the plaintiff’s identity.413  The next day, 
Senator Strong, also of Massachusetts, introduced a more narrowly tai-
lored amendment in the United States Senate.414  One observer who 
spent time with “some of the New-England Delegates” reported that 
they “were unanimously of opinion that an explanation of that part of 
the Constitution should be made.”415  Congress took no action before it 
adjourned two weeks later on March 2, 1793.416 
With Congress out of session, activity intensified in the states.  In 
Massachusetts, writers reminded the public that prominent Federalists 
— including Sedgwick and Strong — had assured the ratifying con-
vention that Article III would not be construed to permit suits by in-
dividuals against states.  Accordingly, they called for a constitutional 
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amendment to restore that understanding.  An “Anonymous Corres-
pondent” recalled that when opponents pointed out that Article III 
might “comprehend even the State itself, as a party on an action of 
debt; this was denied perem[p]torily by the Federalists, as an absurdity 
in terms.”417 
On July 9, 1793, Governor John Hancock and Attorney General 
James Sullivan were served with a subpoena commanding them to ap-
pear before the Supreme Court in Vassall v. Massachusetts.  Governor 
Hancock called a special session of the General Court to consider Vas-
sall and the issue of state suability.418  Commentators applauded the 
Governor’s action, but stressed that “the only way to get rid of the dif-
ficulty is by an amendment to the constitution of the United States.”419  
Leading up to the special session, commentators continued to remind 
the public of Federalist assurances that the state-citizen diversity pro-
visions of Article III would not be construed to permit suits against 
states.420  Accordingly, Federalists and Antifederalists were united in 
their opposition to state suability.421 
During the special session, members of the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives opposed state suability based on the original under-
standing of the Constitution and the impossibility of coercing states 
without risking civil war.  For example, William Widgery distin-
guished between enforcing federal judgments against individuals and 
enforcing them against states.  He said that if the Constitutional Con-
vention sought to secure “the good and safety of the Nation,” then 
“they never meant that execution should issue against a State.”422  
Such enforcement, he warned, would “endanger the public with all the 
horrors of a civil war.”423  For these reasons, Widgery was “in favor of 
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 417 Letter from an Anonymous Correspondent, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1793, reprinted in 5 
DHSC, supra note 20, at 228. 
 418 Proclamation by John Hancock (July 9, 1973), INDEP. CHRON., July 11, 1793, reprinted in 
5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 387, 388–89. 
 419 GEN. ADVERTISER, July 24, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 391, 391. 
 420 Brutus recounted that apprehensions by members of the Massachusetts Convention about 
the scope of Article III “were said to be groundless by the advocates of the Constitution.”  Brutus, 
INDEP. CHRON., July 18, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 392, 392.  A Republican 
recalled that both Federalists and Antifederalists “mutually and cordially consented, that the ‘su-
ability’ of the States was not contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution; . . . and in fact 
could never bear that construction.”  The Crisis, No. XIII by “A Republican,” INDEP. CHRON., 
July 25, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 395, 396.  He therefore urged state legisla-
tors to oppose “a construction, in direct opposition to what ‘THE PEOPLE,’ by their Representa-
tives, openly, and expressly declared against.”  Id. at 397. 
 421 See Letter from Fisher Ames to Alexander Hamilton (Aug. 31, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 
20, at 415 (“I conceive the entire active for[ce] of the state politics to be hostile to the [Chisholm] 
decision.”). 
 422 William Widgery’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, INDEP. 
CHRON., Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 427, 429. 
 423 Id. at 428. 
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doing away [with] all the State Suability,” and urged adoption of an 
amendment specifying “that the Judicial Court may not construe [the 
Constitution] in a different manner from that which the States  
intended.”424 
John Davis also favored an amendment, but defended the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Article III as consistent with “the plain sense 
and meaning of the words.”425  He agreed that it was inexpedient to 
permit a state to be sued by an individual.  He also thought that resort 
to such suits was generally unnecessary because “with respect to many 
controversies there was other sufficient remedy” against individuals.426  
He admitted that suing a state might be the only way to remedy a 
state’s breach of contract, but nonetheless opposed this course of ac-
tion because: 
It left the same capital, prominent defect in the Constitution, which pre-
vailed in the old confederation, that it operated upon States and not upon 
individuals.  The difficulties and dangers that might ensue the attempt to 
execute such a power it was unnecessary to detail.  They were so many 
and so great, that no one had yet suggested a mode, by which execution 
could be satisfied.427 
Charles Jarvis responded that even if the Constitution is “equivocal in 
its meaning in this part of the judiciary article[,] . . . the inference 
ought to be against the Suability of a State.”428  Accordingly, he urged 
his colleagues not to “rest, till either the judiciary article is erased from 
the Constitution, as it respects the point in question, or, till it is so 
modified, as not to admit a similar decision in [the] future.”429 
On September 27, 1793, the Massachusetts General Court advised 
the Governor that “no answer WILL be made” by the state in Vassall v. 
Massachusetts.430  On the same day, the General Court resolved that 
the “power claimed . . . of compelling a State to be made defen-
dant . . . at the suit of an individual . . . is . . . unnecessary and inexpe-
dient, and in its exercise dangerous to the peace, safety and indepen-
dence of the several States.”431  The General Court resolved: 
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 424 Id. at 430. 
 425 Account of John Davis’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives (Sept. 23, 
1793), INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 431, 432. 
 426 Id. at 433. 
 427 Id. 
 428 Charles Jarvis’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives (Sept. 23, 1793), 
INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 436, 437. 
 429 Id. at 439. 
 430 Reply of the Massachusetts General Court to John Hancock (Sept. 27, 1793), INDEP. 
CHRON., Sept. 30, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 441. 
 431 Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court (Sept. 27, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 
20, at 440. 
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That the Senators from this State in the Congress of the United States be, 
and they hereby are instructed, and the Representatives requested to 
adopt the most speedy and effectual measures in their power, to obtain 
such amendments in the Constitution of the United States as will remove 
any clause or article of the said Constitution which can be construed to 
imply or justify a decision that a State is compellable to answer in any suit 
by an individual or individuals in any Court of the United States.432 
The legislature asked the Governor to send its resolutions to the states, 
and Lieutenant Governor Samuel Adams did so on October 9, 1793.433 
Four states responded by adopting their own resolutions, and by 
implicitly or explicitly criticizing the Supreme Court’s construction of 
Article III.434  In three more states, one House of the legislature 
adopted a similar resolution, but the other House failed to act before 
Congress approved the Eleventh Amendment on March 4, 1794.435  
Although these resolutions differed slightly, all suggested that the Con-
stitution be amended to remove or explain any provision that could be 
construed to authorize any suit by an individual against a state in fed-
eral court.436  As Professor Pfander has explained, “[t]his outpouring of 
state resolutions provides the background against which Congress 
acted in adopting the Eleventh Amendment in 1794.”437 
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 433 See Letter from Samuel Adams to the Governors of the States (Oct. 9, 1793), in 5 DHSC, 
supra note 20, at 442, 442.  On October 8, 1793, Governor Hancock died and Samuel Adams as-
sumed his duties.  Id. at 443–44. 
 434 See 5 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 1792–1797, reprinted in 5 
DHSC, supra note 20, at 609; JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: OCT. 1793, at 99 (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, 
at 338–39; Resolution of North Carolina General Assembly (Jan. 11, 1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, 
supra note 20, at 615, 615; JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HON. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, OF THE STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE: DEC. 1793, at 111 (1794), reprinted 
in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 618, 618. 
 435 See JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra 
note 20, at 610–11; VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE 
STATE OF MARYLAND: NOV. 1793, at 115–16 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 611; 
Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, Nov. 19, 1793, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 
23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 236.  Pennsylvania and Delaware appointed spe-
cial committees, but took no action before Congress acted.  JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION 
OF THE FOURTH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 61–62 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 612–13; JOURNAL OF 
THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE: JAN. 1794, at 9 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, su-
pra note 20, at 614, 615. 
 436 See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA: OCT. 1793, at 99 (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 338 (calling on Virgin-
ia’s Senators and Representatives “to obtain such amendments in the constitution of the United 
States, as will remove or explain any clause or article of the said constitution, which can be con-
strued to imply or justify a decision, that a state is compellable to answer in any suit, by an indi-
vidual or individuals, in any court of the United States”). 
 437 Pfander, supra note 249, at 1339. 
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C.  The Adoption of the Eleventh Amendment 
Both Georgia and Massachusetts had refused to appear before the 
Supreme Court and there was every indication that states would not 
voluntarily comply with judgments against them.438  The country nev-
er had to find out, however, because opponents of the Chisholm deci-
sion acted quickly to repudiate it.  As noted, within two days of the 
Court’s decision, Representative Sedgwick and Senator Strong intro-
duced proposals to amend the Constitution.  Sedgwick’s proposed 
amendment provided: 
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the 
judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the author-
ity of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons, whether a cit-
izen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, or of any body politic or cor-
porate, whether within or without the United States.439 
Sedgwick’s proposal would have barred not only suits against states by 
individuals, but also suits against states by other states, the United 
States, and foreign nations.  This sweeping proposal was “laid on the 
table”440 without further action.441 
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 438 The reaction to Vassall in Massachusetts suggests that it would not have been politically 
possible for state officials to comply with any resulting judgment against the state.  The Georgia 
legislature went so far as to consider a bill declaring that anyone who attempted to enforce the 
judgment in Chisholm would be “declared to be guilty of a felony, and suffer death, without the 
benefit of clergy, by being hanged.”  Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, 
AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 9, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 236.  The Eleventh 
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 439 Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), GAZETTE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 605–06.  Sedg-
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 440 Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), GAZETTE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 606. 
 441 See id. at 605, 606 n.2.  Some commentators suggest that Strong’s proposal must have been 
a compromise because Sedgwick’s proposal was broader.  See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1060.  
This argument fails to appreciate the differences between the two proposals.  As far as their spon-
sors were concerned, both proposals would have prevented individuals from suing states in feder-
al court.  Sedgwick’s proposal went further by prohibiting suits brought by “any body politic or 
corporate, whether within or without the United States.”  Proceedings of the United States House 
of Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 20, 1793, re-
printed in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 605–06.  This proposal would have barred suits against 
states not only by individuals, but also by states, foreign states, and the United States.  There was 
no consensus at the time for such a sweeping amendment.  The state resolutions sought only to 
bar suits by individuals, and even many Antifederalists accepted the need for jurisdiction over 
suits between states, see, e.g., 10 DHRC, supra note 185, at 1409 (statement of George Mason), 
and perhaps suits by foreign states against states.  See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the 
United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive 
Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765 
(2004).  The (over)breadth of Sedgwick’s proposal may explain why the House never acted on it 
and why Sedgwick chose not to reintroduce it in the new Congress.  On its face, Senator Strong’s 
proposal addressed only suits against states by out-of-state citizens.  Nonetheless, it effectively 
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Senator Strong introduced a narrower amendment designed to 
reinstate the Federalists’ preferred construction of the state-citizen di-
versity provisions of Article III, but it also cut across all other catego-
ries of subject matter jurisdiction: 
The judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any Suits in 
Law or Equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any for-
eign State.442 
The Senate considered Strong’s proposal on February 25, 1793,443 but 
took no other action before adjourning a few weeks later.444 
It was during this period that many states (led by Massachusetts) 
called on their Senators and Representatives to amend the Constitu-
tion.445  The new Congress convened on December 2, 1793.  Although 
Representative Sedgwick did not reintroduce his proposal, Senator 
Strong — under renewed pressure from his state — introduced a 
slightly modified version of his earlier proposal: 
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend 
to any Suit in Law or Equity, commenc[ed] or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any foreign State.446 
The only real change from Strong’s original proposal was the insertion 
of the words, “be construed to.”447  This change transformed Strong’s 
proposal from an ordinary amendment (whose object was to alter the 
Constitution) to an explanatory amendment (whose object was to ex-
plain the Constitution and to correct an erroneous judicial interpreta-
tion).448 
The Eleventh Amendment passed overwhelmingly in Congress.  
Before proceeding to a vote, the Senate rejected a proposed amend-
ment and a substitute.  Senator Gallatin sought to limit the broad 
sweep of Strong’s proposal by adding an exception for cases (like Vas-
sall) arising under treaties, and moved that the proposal read: 
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barred all suits by individuals if one assumes — as the Founders did — that the state-citizen pro-
visions were the only portions of Article III that even arguably authorized suits against states by 
individuals.  On this assumption, an in-state citizen would never have a basis for suing a state in 
federal court.  See infra section V.B, pp. 1899–1911. 
 442 Resolution in the United States Senate (Feb. 20, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 607–08. 
 443 Id. at 608 n.1. 
 444 Id.  
 445 See supra section IV.B, pp. 1886–91. 
 446 Resolution in the United States Senate (Jan. 2, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 613 (al-
teration in original) (emphasis added). 
 447 The new draft also capitalized “Judicial Power,” changed “Suits” to “Suit,” and omitted 
“any” prior to “one of the United States.”  These changes appear to be stylistic. 
 448 See infra section V.A, pp. 1896–99; see also Respublica v. Cobbet, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467, 472 
(1798) (observing that “the amendment . . . does not import an alteration of the Constitution, but 
an authoritative declaration of its true construction”). 
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The judicial power of the United States, except in cases arising under 
treaties, made under the authority of the United States, shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States, by citizens of another state, or by citizens 
or subjects of any foreign state.449 
The Senate rejected the Gallatin amendment, confirming — contrary 
to the diversity theory — that the Founders wanted to preclude all 
suits brought by prohibited plaintiffs against states, notwithstanding 
the presence or absence of a federal question.  The second motion of-
fered a complete substitute: 
The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law and 
equity in which one of the United States is a party; but no suit shall be 
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or 
by citizens or subjects of a foreign state, where the cause of action shall 
have arisen before the ratification of this amendment.450 
The Senate rejected this proposal and then passed the Eleventh 
Amendment by a vote of 23 to 2.451 
In the House of Representatives, there was a separate motion to 
soften the Amendment by limiting its protection to states that con-
sented to suits in their own courts.  Specifically, the motion would 
have added the following language to the Amendment: “Where such 
State shall have previously made provision in their own courts, where-
by such suit may be prosecuted to effect.”452  The House rejected this 
proposal by a vote of 77 to 8,453 and then voted 81 to 9 to approve the 
Eleventh Amendment.454 
The Eleventh Amendment was transmitted to the states for ratifi-
cation on March 17, 1794.455  By February 7, 1795 — less than a year 
later — twelve states had ratified the Amendment.456  Although these 
actions satisfied Article V,457 not all states notified Congress of ratifica-
tion in a timely manner.  In 1797, Congress asked the President to 
“adopt some speedy and effectual means of obtaining information” 
from the outstanding states as to “whether they have ratified the 
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 449 Proceedings of the United States Senate, Jan. 14, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, 
at 617 (emphasis added). 
 450 Id. 
 451 Id.  Only Senators Gallatin and Rutherfurd voted against the proposal.  Id. 
 452 Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives, Mar. 4, 1794, reprinted in 5 
DHSC, supra note 20, at 620, 620. 
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 454 Id. at 621–22. 
 455 Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Governors of the States, Mar. 17, 1794, in 5 DHSC, 
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 456 See 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 625–27. 
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amendment proposed by Congress to the Constitution concerning the 
suability of States.”458  After receiving proof of ratification by a suffi-
cient number of states, President Adams informed Congress that the 
Amendment had been adopted.459 
While the states were in the process of ratifying the Eleventh 
Amendment, the Supreme Court continued several suits against states 
on its docket.  It continued Vassall v. Massachusetts through 1796, but 
dismissed it in 1797.  Massachusetts never appeared, and the plaintiff 
apparently failed to prosecute the case.  After learning that Congress 
had approved the Eleventh Amendment, Vassall wrote that “my Ac-
tion falls of Course.”460  After the the President declared the Amend-
ment to be “a Part of the Constitution,”461 the Court heard argument 
in Hollingsworth v. Virginia to consider “[w]hether the Amendment 
did, or did not, supersede all suits depending, as well as prevent the 
institution of new suits, against any one of the United States, by citi-
zens of another State.”462  Counsel in pending cases argued that the 
Amendment should not apply to such cases.463  Attorney General 
Charles Lee responded that the Amendment is “explanatory” and that 
“[i]t was the policy of the people to cut off that branch of the judicial 
power, which had been supposed to authorize suits by individuals 
against states.”464  The Court agreed with Lee and unanimously held 
“that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not 
be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a 
state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or sub-
jects, of any foreign state.”465 
V.  THE TEXT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Understood in historical context, the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment would have made sense to those who adopted it.  The Constitu-
tion was generally understood to constitute a fundamental conceptual 
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 458 Resolution of the United States Congress, Mar. 2, 1797, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 628. 
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supra note 20, at 637–38. 
 460 Letter from William Vassall to James Lloyd (Aug. 7, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 
449. 
 461 Message of President John Adams to the United States Congress (Jan. 8, 1798), in 5 DHSC, 
supra note 20, at 637–38. 
 462 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 378 (1798). 
 463 Id. 
 464 Id. at 381. 
 465 Id. at 382.  The adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the dismissal of the Indiana 
Company’s suit against Virginia may have contributed to Justice Wilson’s financial ruin.  He spe-
culated unsuccessfully in various real estate ventures (including the Indiana Company), and even 
spent time in debtor’s prison while on the Court.  He died impoverished in 1798.  See generally 
CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742–1798 (1956). 
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shift from the Articles of Confederation.  The Articles authorized legis-
lation solely over states, while the Constitution authorized legislation 
solely over individuals.  This shift avoided the need to authorize coer-
cive force as a means of enforcing federal commands against states.  
During the ratification debates, Antifederalists threatened to under-
mine the case for the Constitution by arguing that the state-citizen di-
versity provisions of Article III could be construed as express authori-
zation for individuals to sue states in federal court, and thus that the 
federal government would have implied power to enforce any resulting 
judgments against states.  Leading Federalists denied these claims, 
based in part on their narrow construction of the text in question, and 
in part based on their underlying belief that the Constitution did not 
authorize coercive force against states.  When the Chisholm Court sub-
sequently construed state-citizen diversity jurisdiction to permit suits 
against states, Federalists and Antifederalists united to adopt an “ex-
planatory” amendment to restore their preferred construction.  This 
approach had several advantages.  First, it allowed Federalists to save 
face by authoritatively “explaining” Article III to mean exactly what 
they had said it meant.  Second, it ensured that the Amendment would 
apply retroactively to bar all pending suits brought under the disfa-
vored construction of Article III.  Third, understood against the back-
ground assumptions that the Constitution neither authorized citizens 
to sue their own states nor empowered Congress to coerce states, the 
Amendment satisfied state requests for an amendment that would re-
move or explain any clause of the Constitution that could be construed 
to allow suit by an individual against a state in any court of the Unit-
ed States. 
Understanding the Eleventh Amendment as an explanatory 
amendment also reveals why the text was drafted as written.  Con-
trary to the assertions of modern theorists, the text was neither unde-
rinclusive, overinclusive, nor an incoherent compromise.  The text was 
designed to accomplish just what the states requested — that is, to 
prevent courts from construing “[t]he Judicial power of the United 
States” to allow suits against states by individuals.  To modern eyes, 
the text appears inadequate because it says nothing about suits by in-
state citizens arising under federal law.  The text bars any suit com-
menced or prosecuted against a state by citizens of another state or by 
citizens or subjects of a foreign state.  This approach solved the imme-
diate problems posed by Chisholm (a suit by a citizen of another state) 
and Vassall (a suit by a subject of a foreign state).  By withdrawing 
judicial power to hear any suit by these plaintiffs, the Amendment cut 
across all categories of Article III jurisdiction.  Thus, whether a suit 
arises under state law, general law, or federal law, the Amendment — 
by its terms — prohibits federal courts from hearing any suit brought 
by a prohibited plaintiff against a state. 
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To immunity and diversity theorists, the literal meaning of the text 
creates an unacceptable anomaly: it prevents out-of-state plaintiffs 
from suing states for any reason, while it places no restriction on the 
ability of in-state citizens to sue their states using federal question ju-
risdiction.  Those who wrote and ratified the Amendment would not 
have perceived this anomaly, however, if they did not understand the 
Constitution to permit citizens to sue their own states under any cir-
cumstances.  In proposing and ratifying the Constitution, leading Fed-
eralists insisted that the new plan would not repeat the great and radi-
cal vice of authorizing legislation governing states (as opposed to 
individuals) and would not grant the federal government coercive 
power over states.  Article III arguably contradicted the Federalists’ 
account of the Constitution because some Founders construed an am-
biguity in the state-citizen diversity provisions as express authorization 
for individuals to sue states in federal court.  No one suggested that 
federal question jurisdiction might also provide express authorization 
for individuals to sue states because — unlike the state-citizen diversi-
ty provisions — the text conferring federal question jurisdiction made 
no reference (ambiguous or clear) to suits against states. 
In addition, given their assumptions at the time, the Founders 
would not necessarily have perceived the need for suits against states 
to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution, laws, and treaties.  All of 
the constitutional restrictions on states found in Article I, Section 10 
could be enforced in suits between individuals or in suits brought by 
the states, and thus did not necessarily raise the enforcement problems 
associated with suits against states.  Likewise, if the Founders believed 
that Congress lacked legislative power over states, then federal statutes 
would not give rise to suits against states.  Finally, treaties gave no 
rights to citizens against their own states and, in any event, could be 
fully enforced in suits between individuals.  Based on these assump-
tions, the Founders likely regarded the state-citizen diversity provi-
sions as the only portions of Article III that plausibly could be con-
strued to permit individuals to sue states in federal court.  These same 
assumptions apparently informed the drafting of the Eleventh 
Amendment, and may explain why the Founders perceived no anoma-
ly in the Amendment’s treatment of in-state and out-of-state citizens.  
If the Founders did not understand the Constitution to authorize in-
state citizens to bring federal question suits against states, then they 
would not have understood the Amendment to impose a distinctive 
disability on out-of-state citizens. 
A.  An Explanatory Amendment 
As James Pfander has persuasively shown, the Eleventh Amend-
ment was drafted as an “explanatory” amendment.  Explanatory stat-
utes were common in the eighteenth century in both England and the 
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United States.  Legislatures enacted such statutes “to correct or clarify 
ambiguities in the law.”466  As one treatise writer explained, “[a] declar-
atory or expository statute is one passed with the purpose of removing 
a doubt or ambiguity as to the state of the law, or to correct a con-
struction deemed by the legislature to be erroneous.”467  In a system of 
legislative supremacy, declaratory statutes were used to override prior 
interpretations of the law with which the legislature disagreed.468  
Such statutes typically had retroactive effect.469  In the United States, 
declaratory statutes quickly fell into disuse because state and federal 
constitutional reforms “recognized the sovereignty of the people, sepa-
rated the powers of government, and sought to exclude the legislative 
assemblies from the exercise of judicial powers.”470 
Following Chisholm, the Founders assumed that a federal statute 
(explanatory or otherwise) would not have sufficed to overturn the Su-
preme Court’s construction of the Constitution.471  Thus, within two 
days of the decision, Federalists introduced constitutional amendments 
in the House and Senate to prevent suits against states, but Congress 
adjourned without acting on them.472  Before the next session, state 
legislatures — led by Massachusetts — adopted a series of resolutions 
calling on Congress to amend the Constitution.473  Virginia and North 
Carolina modified Massachusetts’s proposal slightly by calling for 
“such amendments in the constitution of the United States, as will re-
move or explain any clause or article of the said constitution, which 
can be construed to imply or justify a decision, that a state is compel-
lable to answer in any suit, by an individual or individuals, in any 
court of the United States.”474 
When Senator Strong reintroduced his amendment in the new 
Congress, he added three words that by usage and tradition trans-
formed his proposal into an explanatory amendment.  His revised pro-
posal provided that the judicial power “shall not be construed to ex-
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tend to any Suit” thereafter described.475  His proposal was now un-
questionably an explanatory amendment designed to correct (what he 
considered to be) the Supreme Court’s erroneous construction of 
cle III.  This type of amendment had several advantages.  It was 
roactive and would apply to all pending cases, including Chisholm v. 
Georgia and — of particular importance to Senator Strong — Vassall 
v. Massachusetts.476  It also satisfied the requests of several state legis-
latures that the Constitution be “explained.”  Finally, it enabled Feder-
alists like Strong to rebuke the Supreme Court and vindicate the posi-
tion they espoused during ratification — that Article III should not be 
construed to permit out-of-state citizens to sue states in federal court. 
Adopting an explanatory amendment to restore their preferred con-
struction of the judicial power was not merely a political maneuver by 
Federalists to save face.  It also prevented the introduction of the in-
tractable enforcement problems that they designed the Constitution to 
avoid.  As discussed above, one of the Federalists’ strongest arguments 
was that the Constitution — unlike the Articles of Confederation — 
could be enforced without authorizing the use of coercive force against 
states.477  They believed that reliance on such power would lead to 
civil war, and sought to avoid this danger by replacing legislation for 
states (under the Articles) with legislation for individuals (under the 
Constitution).  This shift meant that the new Constitution could be en-
forced solely against individuals rather than states.478 
The ambiguity that Antifederalists identified in the state-citizen di-
versity provisions of Article III threatened to introduce the very dan-
ger that Federalists had worked so hard to avoid in drafting the new 
Constitution.  If controversies “between a State and citizens of another 
State” included suits by individuals against states, then presumably the 
federal government had implied power to enforce any resulting judg-
ments against states.  It is not surprising, therefore, that prominent 
Federalists argued against a construction of Article III that would 
permit this conclusion.  When the Supreme Court rejected their pre-
ferred construction, Federalists led the charge to amend the Constitu-
tion.  Given their fundamental opposition to coercive federal power as 
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 475 Resolution in the United States Senate, Jan. 2, 1794, in 5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 613 (em-
phasis added). 
 476 The Eleventh Amendment also ensured retroactivity by referring to suits “commenced or 
prosecuted” against a state.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  Thus, even if the Supreme Court thought 
that the Amendment did not apply to a suit “commenced” before its ratification, the Amendment 
ensured that the Court could not construe the judicial power to permit any further “prosecution” 
of that suit. 
 477 See supra section III.C, pp. 1853–62. 
 478 As Hamilton put it, the Constitution substituted “the mild and salutary coercion of the ma-
gistracy” for the violent coercion of arms.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 20 (James Madison (with Al-
exander Hamilton)), supra note 12, at 138. 
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a matter of institutional design, Federalists were not just keeping a 
campaign promise; they were acting on their deepest beliefs about how 
to construct a Constitution that would preserve the Union. 
B.  Reassessing the Article III Anomaly 
A fundamental premise of the current debate over the Eleventh 
Amendment is that the text creates an anomalous distinction between 
in-state and out-of-state citizens.  Applied literally, the Amendment 
prevents federal courts from hearing “any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”479  
This prohibition means that out-of-state citizens can never sue states 
in federal court, but leaves in-state citizens free to do so (assuming 
they can invoke one of Article III’s other jurisdictional categories, such 
as federal question jurisdiction).  Both immunity and diversity theo-
rists see this distinction as anomalous.  To immunity theorists, the 
Amendment is underinclusive because allowing in-state citizens to sue 
states would circumvent the broad immunity the Amendment was 
meant to restore.480  To diversity theorists, the Amendment is overin-
clusive because prohibiting out-of-state citizens from invoking federal 
question jurisdiction would undermine federal supremacy and draw an 
irrational distinction between in-state and out-of-state citizens.481  
Immunity theorists would remedy the anomaly by recognizing state 
sovereign immunity beyond the terms of the Amendment (to bar in-
state citizens from suing states).  Conversely, diversity theorists would 
remedy the anomaly by narrowing the Amendment (to permit out-of-
state citizens to bring federal question suits against states). 
Because of the anomaly they perceive in the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, modern commentators sometimes suggest that the 
Amendment either was drafted in haste or reflected an unrecorded 
compromise between Federalists and Antifederalists.  Neither hypothe-
sis rings true in historical context.  Although Senator Strong intro-
duced the Amendment just two days after Chisholm, he had almost a 
year to reflect on the language while Congress was out of session.  
Strong did, in fact, revise his proposal — in light of several state reso-
lutions — to take the form of an explanatory amendment.  There is 
also no evidence that the Amendment was a compromise between 
Federalists (who, on this account, secretly preferred no amendment or 
a narrow amendment) and Antifederalists (who favored a broad 
amendment).  During the ratification debates, Federalists took the lead 
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 479 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  
 480 See supra section II.A, pp. 1826–30. 
 481 See supra section II.B, pp. 1830–32. 
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in convincing the country that the Constitution — unlike the Articles 
of Confederation — could be enforced solely against individuals and 
thus avoided the need to introduce coercive power against states.  
Chisholm construed state-citizen diversity jurisdiction to permit indi-
viduals to sue states, raising the specter of federal enforcement of 
judgments against states.  Given the broader historical context, it is 
not surprising that Federalists led the charge to adopt an explanatory 
amendment to prevent this result.  Antifederalists — who objected to 
the state-citizen provisions all along — supported these efforts.  Nei-
ther side viewed the Eleventh Amendment as a compromise; both saw 
it as vindication of their shared position that the Constitution should 
not allow any suits by individuals against states in federal court or 
grant the federal government coercive power to enforce any resulting 
judgments against states. 
1.  Article III and the Eleventh Amendment in Historical Con-
text. — To understand the Founders’ perspective on the Eleventh 
Amendment and federal question jurisdiction, one must keep in mind 
their fundamental goal of constructing a Constitution that did not re-
quire federal coercion of states in their collective capacities.  At the 
outset of the Constitutional Convention, Madison expressed the hope 
“that such a system would be framed as might render [the use of force 
against states] unnecessary.”482  By the end of the Convention, Madi-
son believed that the delegates had succeeded in framing such a sys-
tem.  Writing to Thomas Jefferson, Madison explained that the Consti-
tution “embraced the alternative of a Government which instead of 
operating, on the States, should operate without their intervention on 
the individuals composing them.”483  This approach avoided the need 
to grant the federal government coercive power to enforce federal law 
directly against states — an approach that Madison believed “could 
evidently never be reduced to practice” without producing a “civil 
war.”484  If Madison was correct about the nature of the Constitution, 
then there was no clear warrant in the document for concluding that 
suits by individuals against states would never arise “under this Con-
stitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority.”485 
There are several indications that the Founders did not understand 
federal question jurisdiction to permit suits by individuals against 
states.  First, the dispute between Federalists and Antifederalists over 
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 482 Notes of James Madison (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 47, 
54. 
 483 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 138, at 131, 132. 
 484 Id. at 131–32.  
 485 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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the meaning of the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III sug-
gests that only an express provision would suffice to abrogate the 
states’ pre-existing immunity from suit and contradict the Founders’ 
decision to withhold coercive power over states.  Antifederalists argued 
that the state-citizen diversity provisions contained “the most clear ex-
pressions” in favor of jurisdiction over such suits against states.486  For 
example, Patrick Henry argued that “the usual meaning of the lan-
guage” in question is that federal courts “shall have cognizance of con-
troversies between a State, and citizens of another State, without dis-
criminating between plaintiff or defendant.”487  Federalists countered 
that the word “between” should be read narrowly to permit suits by, 
but not against, states.  In arguing for this construction, they relied on 
preexisting principles of state sovereign immunity and the lack of fed-
eral power in the proposed Constitution to coerce states.488  Hamilton 
went so far as to argue that the Antifederalists’ reading of the text was 
“altogether forced and unwarrantable.”489  Whatever one thinks about 
the contending positions, the participants in this debate were at least 
arguing over express provisions that could be read to confer jurisdic-
tion over suits against states.  By contrast, the federal question provi-
sion of Article III contains no express reference to suits between, by, or 
against states, and not even the most alarmist Antifederalists suggested 
during ratification that it might authorize suits against states.490  In-
deed, the only Founders who considered whether “the original jurisdic-
tion of the federal court extends to cases between a state and its own 
citizens” concluded that “[t]here is no expression in the proposed plan 
to warrant this construction.”491 
Second, the absence of any contemporaneous objection that the 
Eleventh Amendment was too narrow suggests that the Founders con-
sidered it to be a complete solution to the problem of suits by individ-
uals against states.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Chi-
sholm, Senator Strong introduced an initial version of the Eleventh 
Amendment in the Senate.  This draft — like the final Amendment — 
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 486 Patrick Henry, Debate Address to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 
DHRC, supra note 185, at 1419, 1423.   
 487 Id. 
 488 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 488. 
 489 Id. 
 490 Diversity theorists sometimes suggest that because jurisdiction in Chisholm was based on 
the presence of a state as a party, Justice Iredell’s dissent might be inapplicable to federal question 
suits.  See Amar, supra note 76, at 1472–73; Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1058, 1063.  Casto views 
such suggestions as “unwarranted revisionism.”  CASTO, supra note 330, at 196.  He stresses Ire-
dell’s search for “express words,” and concludes: “If the Constitution’s express reference to suits in 
which states were a party was not sufficient, it is difficult to believe that the more general consti-
tutional language extending jurisdiction to suits arising under federal law would have met Ire-
dell’s test.”  Id. at 196–97. 
 491 Aristides, supra note 15.   
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targeted only suits by out-of-state citizens because the state-citizen di-
versity provisions were the only portions of Article III that anyone 
suggested might abrogate state sovereign immunity.  When Congress 
adjourned, several state legislatures passed resolutions calling on their 
Senators and Representatives to amend the Constitution to prevent 
any suits by individuals against states.  When Congress reconvened, 
Senator Strong reintroduced essentially the same amendment, altered 
only to make clear that it was an explanatory amendment.   
Senator Strong had particularly compelling incentives to be respon-
sive to the demands of his state.  Like all Senators, he was appointed 
by the state legislature.492  In addition, after Chisholm, Massachusetts 
Antifederalists singled him out for criticism by recalling that he had 
assured the state ratifying convention that Article III would not be 
construed to permit individuals to sue states in federal court.493  The 
Supreme Court contradicted his assurances by permitting a British 
subject to sue Massachusetts and by permitting a citizen of South Car-
olina to sue Georgia.  Strong had every reason to propose an amend-
ment — as requested by Massachusetts and other states — that would 
remove or explain any clause of the Constitution that could be con-
strued to permit suits by individuals against states.  Strong’s proposal 
suggests that he saw the state-citizen diversity provisions as the prima-
ry sources of the problem.  By cutting across all heads of jurisdiction, 
however, his amendment also ensured that plaintiffs like Vassall could 
not invoke any other basis for jurisdiction.  Massachusetts Antifederal-
ists apparently regarded Strong’s proposal as a complete solution to 
the problems posed by cases like Chisholm and Vassall.  Although ex-
tremely vocal both in criticizing Strong’s original assurances regarding 
Article III and in calling for a corrective amendment, these individuals 
raised no objections to the scope of Strong’s proposed amendment.  It 
seems unlikely that they (and their representatives in Congress) would 
have remained silent if they had understood the Eleventh Amendment 
to accomplish less than what the Massachusetts legislature had re-
quested — that is, to bar any suit by an individual against a state in 
federal court (including Vassall’s).494 
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 492 According to Professor Casto, “the possibility that [Strong] disregarded his home state legis-
lature’s desires seems remote.”  CASTO, supra note 330, at 208.  Strong was not only sent to the 
Senate by the legislature, but also later served as governor of his state.  Id.  “Far from opposing 
his home state’s political establishment, he was part and parcel of it.”  Id.  
 493 See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 494 Casto points out that Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Virginia had all 
passed resolutions calling for a broad amendment.  CASTO, supra note 330, at 208.  These states 
had more than forty representatives and senators in Congress.  Id.  “If these men thought the Ele-
venth Amendment was inconsistent with the broad directives from their states, the inconsistency 
surely would have been challenged.”  Id.  
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Examination of the Eleventh Amendment in historical context sup-
ports this conclusion.  By its terms, the Amendment prohibits con-
struing the “Judicial power” to extend to “any suit” brought against a 
state by an out-of-state citizen.  This language was sufficient to over-
turn Chisholm and reinstate the Founders’ preferred construction of 
the state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III.  Senator Strong’s 
proposal, however, did more.  It prevented the judicial power from ex-
tending to “any suit” brought by the specified plaintiffs regardless of 
which category of Article III jurisdiction they invoked.  Strong was 
well aware of the pending case of Vassall v. Massachusetts.495  I as-
sume that this suit was brought under the state-citizen diversity provi-
sions of Article III because federal question jurisdiction did not ex-
pressly authorize suits against states.  On the other hand, modern 
readers might assume that Vassall’s suit could have rested on federal 
question jurisdiction as well.  Under either hypothesis, however, the 
text of the Eleventh Amendment was broad enough to prohibit federal 
courts from hearing Vassall’s case.  Thus, it is both linguistically and 
historically inaccurate to suggest — as some diversity theorists do — 
that the Amendment left plaintiffs free to sue states under Article III 
on any basis other than state-citizen diversity.  On this theory, Vassall 
and other British subjects would have been free to pursue their claims 
against states using federal question jurisdiction even after the 
Amendment’s adoption.496 
2.  The Constitution. — Apart from federal question jurisdiction’s 
failure to include express authorization for suits against states, there 
are several indications that the Founders would not have understood 
suits against states to be necessary to enforce the Constitution.  As Jus-
tice Iredell suggested in connection with Chisholm, all of the prohibi-
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 495 See supra notes 320–326 and accompanying text. 
 496 Some commentators seek to avoid this difficulty by stressing that Congress had not yet 
granted lower federal courts general federal question jurisdiction, and therefore foreigners like 
Vassall could not have litigated their treaty claims after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.  
This argument overlooks the fact that all of the suits against states in the 1790s — including Vas-
sall — were brought under section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave the Supreme Court 
original jurisdiction over “all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except be-
tween a state and its citizens.”  An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 
1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789).  This provision did not expressly restrict jurisdiction based on the type of 
claim presented.  Rather, it was broad enough to authorize the Supreme Court to hear any suit 
involving a state permitted by Article III.  Cf. James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s 
Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction encompasses federal question as well as state-citizen diversity cases).  
If — as diversity theorists maintain — the Eleventh Amendment merely repealed state-citizen 
diversity jurisdiction and did not affect federal question jurisdiction, then suits against states aris-
ing under treaties (like Vassall’s) could have continued unimpeded under section 13.  But see 
CASTO, supra note 330, at 207 (maintaining that “under both the Constitution and the Judiciary 
Act, the Supreme Court’s trial jurisdiction over suits by an individual against a state was abso-
lutely limited to party-based jurisdiction”).   
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tions placed on states in the original Constitution could be enforced 
through ordinary litigation between individuals or suits brought by 
states.497  Consider Article I, Section 10’s prohibitions against coining 
money, emitting bills of credit, and making anything but gold and sil-
ver a legal tender in payment of debts.498  If a state violated any of 
these prohibitions, a creditor could simply refuse to accept improper 
payment and sue his debtor.  If the debtor raised state law as a de-
fense, the creditor could then assert its invalidity under the Constitu-
tion.  A similar analysis applies to the prohibitions against bills of at-
tainder and ex post facto laws499 (and, for that matter, to the 
comparable prohibitions on the United States).500  If a state initiated 
an action to enforce such a law against an individual, the Constitution 
provides a complete defense.  A suit against the state would have been 
unnecessary to enforce these prohibitions. 
Justice Wilson cited the prohibition on state imposts and duties as 
support for state suability in Chisholm, noting that the clause renders 
such state laws “subject to the revision and controul of the Con-
gress.”501  But, again, enforcement of this provision need not entail 
suits by individuals against states or direct federal coercion of states.  
Assume that a state passed a prohibited duty and that Congress 
enacted a law to revise that duty.  This federal statute would qualify as 
“the supreme Law of the Land” under the Supremacy Clause, and thus 
override contrary state law.502  If a state attempted to collect a prohib-
ited duty, the owner of the goods could defeat the operation of the duty 
by simply invoking the Constitution either as a defendant in an en-
forcement action or as a plaintiff suing the state officer to recover the 
goods in question or appropriate damages. 
These examples highlight an important point about the way in 
which the Founders may have expected individuals to enforce consti-
tutional prohibitions on government action.  Absent a constitutional 
provision expressly authorizing suits against the sovereign — such as 
the contested state-citizen diversity provisions of Article III —
individuals would have been expected to enforce their rights only by 
raising the Constitution as a defense to an enforcement action503 or by 
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 497 See James Iredell’s Observations on “this great Constitutional Question” (Feb. 18, 1793), in 
5 DHSC, supra note 20, at 186, 186; see also infra p. 1885. 
 498 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 499 See id.   
 500 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.   
 501 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 502 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 503 Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (reviewing state court denial of crimi-
nal defendant’s federal defense). 
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suing government officers at common law.504  Because courts did not 
yet recognize modern notions of qualified immunity, all of the Article I 
prohibitions imposed on states and the United States could have been 
enforced by these traditional means.505  The Bill of Rights — adopted 
after the Constitution but before the Eleventh Amendment — illus–
trates the importance of this enforcement paradigm.  The purpose of 
the Bill of Rights was to impose restrictions on the United States in 
order to safeguard individual liberty.  There is no indication, however, 
that anyone understood these restrictions to authorize individuals to 
sue the United States directly, even though one might argue that such 
suits “arise under” the Constitution for other purposes.  The reason is 
that — at the time — the Bill of Rights could be fully enforced by oth-
er, widely accepted means.  Some of the prohibitions could be asserted 
as defenses by defendants prosecuted by the United States.  Others 
could be enforced by individuals against federal officers in suits at 
common law.  If the officer asserted that his conduct was authorized 
by federal law, the individual could defeat this defense if the law vi-
olated the Constitution.506 
Indeed, one of the primary reasons that Antifederalists sought a 
Bill of Rights was to guarantee trial by jury in civil cases.507  This 
right was considered essential to the enforcement of all other restric-
tions on government conduct because — even assuming sovereign im-
munity — it ensured that government officers could be held accounta-
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 504 For an illuminating discussion of state officer suits as a means of enforcing federal law, see 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824), which concludes that even if the Elev-
enth Amendment exempts a state from suit, “the Court may act upon the agents employed by the 
State, and on the property in their hands.”  Id. at 847. 
 505 The central role played by officer suits may surprise modern readers because today state 
and federal officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit.  See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800 (1982).  In the eighteenth century, government officers enjoyed no such immunity and were 
personally liable in tort even for good faith mistakes regarding the scope of their authority.  See 
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (holding that a federal officer following a presiden-
tial order was personally liable for seizing a vessel without statutory authority). 
 506 See Engdahl, supra note 283, at 14.  As Professor Jerry Mashaw has explained: “Actions 
were personal, against the individual; damages were a normal remedy; and office-holding carried 
no special immunity from suit.  Officers could plead their statutory authority as a defense, but if 
the court — or jury — thought them wrong on the law or the facts, liability followed.”  Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations 1787–1801, 115 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1334 (2006); see also Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Re-
medial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 
67–68 (1999) (describing analogous suits against officers to enforce just compensation  
requirements). 
 507 See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. 
L. REV. 639, 667 (1973); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, 
at 495 (“The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this 
State, and perhaps in several of the other States, is that relative to the want of a constitutional 
provision for the trial by jury in civil cases.”). 
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ble by the people in actions at law, whether in state or federal court.508  
Writing in late 1787, one Antifederalist argued that a right to trial by 
jury was necessary because federal courts sitting without juries might 
be “ready to protect the officers of government against the weak and 
helpless citizen.”509  Indeed, Professor Amar has identified “strong  
linkages between the Fourth and Seventh Amendments.”510  In partic-
ular, the Seventh Amendment facilitated recoveries against federal of-
ficers who violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.  Both in England and America, the 
traditional remedy for such abuse was to sue the offending officer for 
damages.511  Antifederalists feared that without civil juries, “every ar-
bitrary act of the general government, and every oppression of [its of-
ficers] for the collection of taxes, duties, imposts, excise, and other 
purposes, must be submitted to by the individual.”512  The right to tri-
al by jury in civil suits against government officers gave citizens a sig-
nificant means of checking government misconduct.513  As Amar has 
recounted, “[i]n America, both before and after the Revolution, the civ-
il trespass action tried to a jury flourished as the obvious remedy 
against haughty customs officers, tax collectors, constables, marshals, 
and the like.”514 
This background suggests that the Founders may have assumed 
that common law actions against officers would be the primary means 
of enforcing the prohibitions against the United States set forth in both 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  No one suggested that Article 
III granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear suits by individuals 
against the United States arising under the Constitution or the Bill of 
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 508 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 775–78 
(1994).  Presumably, common law trespass actions against federal officers would be brought in 
state court, with a right to trial by jury under state law.  If Congress authorized removal of such 
actions to federal court, the Seventh Amendment ensured that the plaintiff would retain the right 
to trial by jury. 
 509 Essay of a Democratic Federalist, PENN. HERALD, Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE 
COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 58, 61 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 510 Amar, supra note 508, at 775. 
 511 See id. at 774–76, 786; Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign 
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1963) (“If the subject was the victim of illegal official action, in 
many cases he could sue the King’s officers for damages.”); see also BRADFORD P. WILSON, 
ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY 9–33 (1986). 
 512 Luther Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, 1788, in 2 
THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 509, at 27, 71 (emphasis omitted); see also Es-
says by Hampden, MASS. CENTINEL, Feb. 2, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE 
ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 509, at 198, 200 (“Without [a jury], in civil actions, no relief can be 
had against the High Officers of State, for abuse of private citizens . . . .”). 
 513 See Engdahl, supra note 283, at 19. 
 514 Amar, supra note 508, at 786; cf. Jaffe, supra note 511, at 14 (“Earlier actions against [En-
glish] officers were typically in trespass for taking of goods, interference with land, or laying 
hands on the person.”). 
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Rights.  The reason was that federal question jurisdiction did not con-
stitute an express waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity.  
Such jurisdiction, however, did ensure that federal courts could enforce 
the Constitution in common law actions against government officers 
who claimed that their (unconstitutional) conduct was authorized by 
law.  If the Founders did not understand federal question jurisdiction 
to authorize suits against the United States, it would be surprising if 
they understood it to authorize suits against states.  Such jurisdiction 
played a crucial role in ensuring the supremacy of federal law in suits 
against state and federal officials, but it was not explicit enough either 
to override preexisting notions of sovereign immunity or to confer the 
kind of coercive power over states that the Founders disavowed in 
drafting and ratifying the Constitution.515 
There was one constitutional prohibition that at least arguably re-
quired enforcement against states.  The Contracts Clause provides that 
no state shall pass any “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”516  
Justice Wilson invoked this clause in Chisholm517 to support state su-
ability.  He asked: “What good purpose could this Constitutional pro-
vision secure, if a State might pass a law impairing the obligation of its 
own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of right, to no 
controuling judiciary power?”518  When adopted, however, the clause 
was generally understood to apply only to private contracts between 
individuals, not to a state’s own contracts.519  The clause was modeled 
on the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided that “no law 
ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall in 
any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts.”520  At 
the Convention, Rufus King “moved to add, in the words used in the 
Ordinance of Congs establishing new States, a prohibition on the 
States to interfere in private contracts.”521  The delegates initially 
thought that the Ex Post Facto Clause would reach laws impairing the 
obligation of contracts,522 but later concluded that “the terms ‘ex post 
facto’ related to criminal cases only.”523  Accordingly, they added a 
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 515 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 488. 
 516 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 517 See supra p. 1881. 
 518 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 465 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 519 See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE 
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 522 Id. at 440. 
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prohibition on “laws altering or impairing the obligation of con-
tracts.”524 
During the ratification debates, only two Antifederalists (neither of 
whom attended the Constitutional Convention) suggested that the 
Contracts Clause might apply to public as well as private contracts,525 
and they were quickly corrected by delegates who had attended the 
Convention.526  Professor Benjamin Wright, the leading scholar on the 
clause, concludes that a “careful search has failed to unearth any other 
statements even suggesting that the contract clause was intended to 
apply to other than private contracts.”527  Modern scholars — includ-
ing those skeptical of sovereign immunity — acknowledge that the 
Contracts Clause was not clearly understood originally to apply to 
public contracts.528  If the Founders understood the clause to apply on-
ly to private contracts, then they would not have expected the clause to 
generate suits against states or necessitate coercive enforcement. 
3.  The Laws of the United States. — There is a relatively straight-
forward reason why the Founders may not have expected suits against 
states to arise under the laws of the United States.  As discussed, the 
Founders did not understand the Constitution to grant Congress legis-
lative power over states.  This was the “great and radical vice” in the 
existing Confederation,529 and the Founders were determined not to 
repeat this mistake.  Accordingly, leading Federalists emphasized that 
the Constitution granted Congress the power to tax and regulate indi-
viduals instead of states, and thus did not grant the power to coerce 
states.  This meant that neither the executive branch nor the judicial 
branch would be in the position of having to enforce federal legislative 
commands against states.  Instead, these branches would simply en-
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force legislative commands against individuals.  This approach 
avoided the dangerous expedient of military coercion against states by 
substituting “the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy” in place 
of “violence.”530  It also meant that suits against states would not arise 
under “the Laws of the United States.” 
Modern readers may be puzzled by the Founders’ evident under-
standing of the Constitution because today’s assumptions about con-
gressional power over states are different.  Changed circumstances 
have contributed to this dichotomy.  The original understanding was 
informed by a desire to avoid a civil war.  Our modern understanding, 
by contrast, developed in the aftermath of the Civil War.  The Civil 
War Amendments expressly prohibit certain state practices — includ-
ing denials of liberty, due process, equal protection, and voting rights 
— and give Congress express power to enforce these prohibitions.531  
These constitutional provisions arose out of the Civil War, and their 
proponents were more than willing to enforce them against states 
through suits and — if necessary — military force.  Examining the 
original Constitution from the Founders’ perspective, however, reveals 
why those who drafted and ratified the Eleventh Amendment would 
not have understood federal question jurisdiction to permit citizens of 
any state to sue a state to enforce a federal command at the time the 
Amendment was adopted. 
4.  Treaties. — It appears that the Founders did not expect suits by 
individuals against states to arise under treaties both because federal 
question jurisdiction did not expressly authorize such suits, and be-
cause of the nature of treaties in the eighteenth century.  The most im-
portant treaty at the time of the Founding was the 1783 Treaty of 
Peace with Great Britain.  Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, 
states were notorious for interfering with the operation of the Trea-
ty.532  Article IV of the Treaty provided that “creditors on either side, 
shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value 
in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”533  
Many states enacted and enforced laws that made it difficult, if not 
impossible, for British creditors to recover their preexisting debts in 
state court.  For example, Virginia enacted a statute during the war 
discharging British debts if the debtor paid the state instead of the 
British creditors.534  Judge Gibbons has suggested that the Founders 
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expected British creditors to bring suits arising under the Treaty di-
rectly against states,535 but it is more likely that they expected credi-
tors to sue their individual debtors and rely on the Treaty to defeat any 
state law defenses.536 
Ware v. Hylton537 demonstrates how the Treaty could be enforced 
without resort to suits against states.  British creditors sued Virginia 
debtors and the latter argued that their debts had been discharged un-
der the Virginia statute.  The creditors invoked the Treaty and the Su-
preme Court held that it preempted contrary state law under the Su-
premacy Clause.538  Ware shows that treaties could be fully enforced in 
suits between individuals; there was no need for an individual to sue 
the state.  Justice Paterson made this point explicitly in Ware: “Did this 
clause make Virginia liable to a prosecution for the debt?  Is Virginia 
now suable by such British creditor?  No; he would in such case be to-
tally remediless, unless the nation of which he is a subject, would in-
terpose in his behalf.”539 
Article VI of the Treaty of Peace could also be enforced through 
suits between individuals.  The Treaty drew an important distinction.  
With respect to property confiscated before the Treaty, Article V mere-
ly “recommend[ed] it to the legislatures of the respective states, to pro-
vide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties, which have 
been confiscated.”540  By contrast, with respect to property not yet con-
fiscated, Article VI declared that “there shall be no future confiscations 
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made.”541  Thus, if a state confiscated real property owned by British 
subjects after the Treaty was adopted, the original owner could bring 
an action against the individuals in possession to recover the property 
in question.  If the defendants invoked state law to establish their right 
of possession, the claimant could simply invoke the Treaty as the su-
preme law of the land to override such law.  Although perhaps less 
convenient than suing the state directly, this course ordinarily would 
suffice to uphold the supremacy of the rights conferred by the treaty.  
More importantly, this course avoided all of the dangers — including 
the potential for civil war — that might arise from enforcement of fed-
eral judgments against states. 
Understood in its historical context, the Eleventh Amendment 
would not have created the anomaly that modern commentators per-
ceive with respect to cases arising under treaties.  Although the 
Amendment is limited to denying judicial power over suits against 
states by out-of-state and foreign citizens, the Founders did not expect 
that citizens would ever have occasion to sue their own states in cases 
arising under treaties.  The reason is simple.  In the eighteenth century, 
treaties were exclusively concerned with how nations treated each oth-
er or how they (or their citizens) treated foreign citizens.542  The use of 
treaties to govern how nations treat their own citizens did not begin 
until well into the twentieth century.543  The Treaty of Peace exempli-
fies the eighteenth century paradigm.  It expressly restricted the states’ 
ability to confiscate the property of British citizens, but it placed no 
restrictions on the states’ ability to confiscate the property of their own 
citizens.  Thus, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, barring 
out-of-state citizens from bringing any suits against states would have 
created no anomaly.  As far as the Founders were concerned, after the 
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, there was no basis for either in-
state or out-of-state citizens to sue states on the basis of a treaty. 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 
Taken in its historical context, the Eleventh Amendment did not 
create absurd or anomalous distinctions between in-state and out-of-
state citizens.  Because the Founders believed that the Constitution 
neither imposed affirmative obligations on states nor authorized Con-
gress to exercise legislative power over states, they would not have un-
derstood federal question jurisdiction to constitute express authoriza-
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tion for federal courts to hear suits against states by their own citizens.  
Thus, prohibiting federal courts from hearing any suit against a state 
by an out-of-state citizen was a coherent and efficient means of both 
restoring the Founders’ preferred construction of Article III and avoid-
ing the enforcement problems posed by judgments against states in fa-
vor of individuals.  Keeping the Founders’ assumptions in mind, they 
would not have understood the Constitution to provide any basis for 
individuals to sue states in federal court after the adoption of the Elev-
enth Amendment.  Because the Amendment made sense when 
adopted, the absurdity doctrine provides no warrant for departing 
from the text as written.  Adhering to the text and dismissing any suit 
that falls within its terms would avoid the problem of purposive “free-
standing federalism” divorced from the constitutional text.544  If the 
Supreme Court wishes to continue to shield states from suits brought 
by their own citizens, then it must rest its decisions on the nature of 
the Union rather than the Eleventh Amendment.  
The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides an incomplete basis 
for much of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding state sov-
ereign immunity.  For example, Hans v. Louisiana545 and its progeny 
suggest that the purpose of the Amendment was to prevent both in-
state and out-of-state citizens from suing states in federal court for 
breach of contract, but the text is much narrower.  It is true that the 
Founders assumed that suits like Hans would not arise because the 
original understanding of the Contracts Clause appears to have been 
limited to impairment of private contracts.546  In 1810, however, the 
Supreme Court began interpreting the clause to apply to public as well 
as private contracts.547  These cases, along with Congress’s enactment 
of general federal question jurisdiction in 1875,548 paved the way for 
cases like Hans that arose when states began defaulting on their public 
obligations. 
It is important to recognize that expanded interpretations of the 
Contracts Clause and federal question jurisdiction — rather than the 
Eleventh Amendment — created the anomaly that the Hans Court 
sought to avoid.  In-state citizens could now sue their states for violat-
ing the Contracts Clause, while out-of-state citizens were barred by the 
terms of the Amendment from bringing identical suits against the same 
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states.  The Court considered the supposition that the framers and ra-
tifiers of the Amendment had left citizens free to sue their own states 
to be “almost an absurdity on its face.”549  To prevent this anomaly, the 
Court recognized state sovereign immunity beyond the terms of the 
Amendment, but failed to ground such immunity firmly in the consti-
tutional text.  There were at least two alternative rationales available.  
First, the Court could have returned to the original understanding of 
the Contracts Clause rather than expanding immunity beyond the 
terms of the Eleventh Amendment.550  Had it chosen this course, the 
Hans Court could have dismissed the case not for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, but for failure to state a claim under federal law.551  
Second, the Court could have dismissed the case on the ground that 
Article III's grant of federal question jurisdiction, as originally under-
stood, did not provide an express authorization for federal courts to 
entertain suits by individuals against states. 
The Supreme Court has also recognized other kinds of immunity 
outside the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.  In Principality of Mo-
naco v. Mississippi,552 for example, the Court held that a state is im-
mune from suit brought by a foreign state.  The authorization for ju-
risdiction in such cases is found in the same portion of Article III as 
the state-foreign citizen diversity clause.  The entire provision states 
that the judicial power shall extend to controversies “between a State, 
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”553  
Because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits only those constructions 
of Article III that would permit any suit against a state by “Citizens or 
Subjects” of a foreign state, one might conclude that the Amendment 
contains a negative implication that Article III permits foreign states 
to sue states in federal court.554  Moreover, the purpose of the 
Amendment — to avoid risking a civil war by enforcing federal com-
mands against states — is arguably inapplicable when a foreign state 
sues a state.  In the latter case, providing a federal forum to adjudicate 
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the dispute might actually help to prevent a war with a foreign 
state.555 
The Supreme Court has not only recognized immunity outside the 
Eleventh Amendment, but also disregarded key portions of the 
Amendment by permitting some suits barred by its terms.  For exam-
ple, the Court has long held that the Amendment does not prohibit 
suits against states if the state waives its immunity.556  The text of the 
Amendment, however, says nothing about immunity.  Rather, it prohi-
bits federal courts from construing the judicial power to extend to any 
suit against a state by a prohibited plaintiff.557  Because the Amend-
ment is written as a limitation on “the judicial power,” it deprives fed-
eral courts of subject matter jurisdiction — a defect that cannot ordi-
narily be waived by the parties.558 
Similarly, because the Eleventh Amendment limits the scope of the 
judicial power, Congress cannot authorize citizens of another state or 
of a foreign state to sue states in federal court.  To do so would exceed 
the constitutionally prescribed limits of the judiciary’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.  By contrast, assuming that federal question jurisdiction 
permits federal courts to hear suits by individuals against states, Con-
gress may create federal causes of action against states by their own 
citizens so long as Congress acts pursuant to a constitutional power 
that permits regulation of states.  Accordingly, the constitutionality of 
such legislation would turn not on the Eleventh Amendment, but on 
the scope of Congress’s powers under both the original Constitution 
and the Civil War Amendments.  Although the Founders understood 
the original Constitution not to grant Congress power to enact legisla-
tion for states in their political capacity or to enforce federal com-
mands against states,559 the Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’s 
Article I, Section 8 powers differently in the modern era.560 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida561 illustrates these points.  The 
case did not implicate the terms of the Eleventh Amendment because 
Florida was sued by its own citizens pursuant to a federal statute.  
The case turned, therefore, on the scope of congressional power.   
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Nonetheless, the Court concluded that “[e]ven when the Constitution 
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular 
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of 
suits by private parties against unconsenting States.”562  The Court’s 
reasoning is difficult to square with the Amendment’s terms.  The 
Amendment bars only suits against states by out-of-state citizens.  If 
(as the Court assumed) Congress had constitutional power to authorize 
the suit in question, then the Amendment was largely beside the point.  
Assuming that federal question jurisdiction encompasses suits against 
states, the Court should have decided the case by reference to whether 
Article I, Section 8 grants Congress legislative power over states.  As 
discussed, the Founders understood the original Constitution not to 
empower Congress either to exercise legislative power over states or to 
coerce states.   
Modern assumptions about the scope of federal power are very dif-
ferent.  For example, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority,563 the Supreme Court held that Congress may subject 
states, as employers, to the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The Garcia 
Court read Article I, Section 8 to authorize Congress to regulate states 
to the same extent that it authorizes Congress to regulate individuals.  
The Court refused to recognize any exemption for “States as States.”564  
As others have observed, the Court’s subsequent decisions in Seminole 
Tribe and Alden v. Maine565 make it difficult to enforce such federal 
commands against states.566  These cases held that Congress cannot 
authorize citizens to sue their own states in either federal or state court 
as a means of enforcing Congress’s regulation of states.567 
These two lines of cases are difficult to reconcile.568  The important 
point for present purposes, however, is that the Eleventh Amendment 
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has little to say about the issue.  How one decides these cases depends 
on one’s conception of the scope of Congress’s Article I, Section 8 
powers, which in turn depends on one’s approach to constitutional in-
terpretation.569  As discussed, the Founders’ original intent seems to 
have been that the Constitution withholds power from Congress both 
to leg 
islate for states (as opposed to individuals) and to coerce state com-
pliance with federal commands.570  By contrast, the original public 
meaning of the text may or may not reflect this understanding because 
the Constitution does not expressly grant or deny congressional power 
over states.571  A dynamic approach to interpretation might rely on 
changed circumstances to conclude that — notwithstanding the origi-
nal understanding — the Constitution should now be construed to give 
Congress power to regulate both individuals and states.572  Finally, re-
gardless of how one resolves these complex interpretive questions, 
stare decisis arguably counsels in favor of maintaining the states’ long-
recognized immunities over more recent decisions that endorse broad 
congressional power over states.573  Although these questions are 
beyond the scope of this article, the important point here is that their 
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resolution turns on the scope of congressional power rather than on the 
precise meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.  
The Supreme Court has drawn at least one distinction, however, 
that appears to make sense in historical context.  The Court has held 
that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pur-
suant to its power to enforce the Civil War Amendments even though 
it cannot do so pursuant to Article I, Section 8.574  The original Consti-
tution was framed to avoid a civil war by denying Congress legislative 
power over states.  The Civil War Amendments, by contrast, were 
framed in the aftermath of the Civil War to prohibit unacceptable 
state action and to empower Congress to enforce such prohibitions.  
This difference suggests — as the Court held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer575 
— that congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity is consti-
tutional pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if 
such abrogation would be unconstitutional pursuant to Article I, Sec-
tion 8.576  In other words, federal statutes authorizing suits against 
states under section 5 rest on express constitutional “authority for con-
gressional interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”577 
Congressional enforcement of the Civil War Amendments is unlike-
ly to contradict the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.  The Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments primarily restrict the 
way states treat their own citizens.  Thus, suits against states to en-
force such restrictions will not ordinarily implicate the Eleventh 
Amendment’s specific withdrawal of federal judicial power to hear 
suits against states by citizens of other states.  In sum, the distinct his-
torical contexts surrounding the adoption of the original Constitution 
and the Civil War Amendments provide an added justification for the 
Supreme Court’s distinctive treatment of congressional abrogation of 
state sovereign immunity under Article I, Section 8 and under section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Modern theorists tend to discount the precise terms of the Eleventh 
Amendment.  They regard the Amendment as either unacceptably un-
derinclusive or unacceptably overinclusive because it appears to bar 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 574 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 
(1976)). 
 575 427 U.S. 445. 
 576 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65–66 (explaining that “the Fourteenth Amendment, 
adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitu-
tion, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Ar-
ticle III and the Eleventh Amendment”). 
 577 Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1880)). 
1918 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1817 
all suits against states by out-of-state citizens while leaving in-state cit-
izens free to sue under federal question jurisdiction.  Textualists agree 
that the Amendment is less than coherent, but assume that this was 
the result of an unrecorded compromise necessary to secure its adop-
tion.  This Article maintains that the terms of the Amendment made 
sense in historical context.  The key to understanding the Amendment 
is to read it in light of the Founders’ understanding of the nature of 
the Union.  In their view, the Constitution did not authorize Congress 
to exercise legislative power over states or to use coercive force against 
states to enforce federal commands.  For this reason, only an express 
constitutional provision would suffice to authorize suits against states 
in federal court.  The Founders publicly debated whether the state-
citizen diversity provisions of Article III constituted such authoriza-
tion.  By contrast, the Founders do not appear to have expected feder-
al question jurisdiction to generate any suits by any citizens against 
any states.  Thus, amending the Constitution to bar “any suit” against 
a state by out-of-state citizens provided a complete solution to the 
problem of state suability presented by cases like Chisholm v. Georgia 
and Vassall v. Massachusetts.  This course created no anomaly be-
tween the ability of in-state and out-of-state citizens to sue states in 
federal court because — from the Founders’ perspective — neither 
group of citizens had an express basis for suing a state in federal court 
after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.  Because the Amend-
ment made sense in historical context, the anomaly that modern theo-
rists perceive provides an inadequate basis for departing from its pre-
cise text. 
 
